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Abstract
The wide deployment of more and more sophisticated services and applica-
tion over Internet imposes to careful project solutions for face the threats
that this spreading involved. Unfortunately, the computer networks were de-
signed neglecting the problem of security, since they ware thinking as “open
systems” where anyone could use them as it liked, and malicious users was
not considered.
The lack of security requires to study alternative solutions that integrate
the existing network technologies. The interest in computer network security
is growing in the last year and new ideas have been proposed.
In this thesis we present a cooperative approach to network security. By
sharing information about evidence of anomalous user’s activities it is possi-
ble to improve the effectiveness of the overall system by a careful prevention
and detection of attacks. In this way the cooperation is able to overcome the
intrinsic design limits of existing computer networks.
By analyzing several collaborative systems, we define a general framework
for the design and implementation of a reliable cooperative solution.
Based on this framework, we implement two systems that share common
project’s principles: a cooperative DoS detection system and a new secure
routing protocol for wireless networks.
The results prove the goodness of design and the capability of framework
proposed to be extended to several problems of network security.
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Chapter 1
Cooperation and Distributed
Information
1.1 Introduction
One of the main strength of Internet since its origin has been the capability
of connecting people and systems around the world, increasing the opportu-
nities of communication, collaboration and cooperation among them. The
well-known Information Society is a result of the growing’s process of In-
ternet. More and more people are beginning to use the network to benefit
of new services, and new social and geographic scenario is going to open to
services providers. The information exchanging is the most important mer-
its of Internet, bringing in contact different cultures and helping for their
development.
In spite of all others communication systems as press, telephony or TV,
Internet better represents the main expression of the Power of Communica-
tion. Indeed, its features of anywhere, anytime and, usually, for anyone are
the reasons why Internet is more and more perceived by the people as an ex-
traordinarily powerful mean of communication and an inexhaustible source
of information. The motivation is that Internet is able to go beyond the
temporal and spatial locality.
Several definitions for power of communication have been proposed. We
think that the must appropriate one is that power of communication is the
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capability to have any kind of advantages from exchanging information.
This is definitely true for people. The communication, indeed, has had a
great influence for society development, and it is expression of freedom. It is
well-known that the absence of communication produce poverty, unfairness
and lack of democracy. Totalitarian regimes find every time ways to control
and counter the political impact of communication media, in particular of
Internet [1].
The information, or better, the knowledge of the “experiences” around
the world can help a community, a nation, to correctly grow. In few words we
can say that everything happens around the world can contribute to improve
locally the prosperity of people if they know about these events. So we can
claim that global information can improve any “local” human process.
This is not true just for the human beings. Far from to be a treaty on
the social implications of communication and Internet, indeed, we want just
to observed that the information exchange could be a key factor for any
computation system too. In this context the communication is just a way to
collect information around in order to improve the performance of a system.
Any time we share information among different entities we are talking of
“cooperation”. In computer system context, as for the human beings, the
cooperation can significantly contribute to improve the “performance”.
The cooperation sometimes is required as solution for overcome some
infrastructure constrains. Several problems, indeed, drive for encouraging
the collaboration among the different elements of a distributed system in
order to improve the performance.
First of all, the networks are becoming more and more heterogeneous in-
frastructures, where different technical and methodological solutions cohabit
all together. The interoperability between Internet and the cellular phones
network is just an example of this heterogeneity. Sometimes providing a ser-
vice, as a VoIP call, needs to involve several elements of the network which
usually have different technologies, softwares, and resources availability. A
priori knowledge of these situations can help to properly deploy the service
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with better performance in terms of users’ satisfaction.
The dynamism of infrastructures is also a reason for adopting collabo-
rative solutions. The networks are more and more dominated by mobile
technologies. Such technology has certainly changed the way to communi-
cate. It has introduced remarkable advantages for people, but unfortunately
it has required a great effort for providing a suitable coordination needed
for such technology. The sensor networks, for example, require to exploit
cooperative mechanism to solve the lack of physical network infrastructure.
Routing protocol is an example of mechanism that can take advantage from
the a cooperative solution.
Sometimes the peculiarities of the infrastructure don’t allow to have the
reasonable standard of security. Again the wireless networks are the better
example of vulnerable infrastructures that can be easily compromised. Fre-
quently, indeed, a malicious elements can easily evade the traditional security
solutions attempting the safety and the correctness of the whole system. A
collaborative solution, based on information exchange, should mitigate such
risks. In such a way also resiliency capabilities should be assure to make the
network robust to the faults.
Allowing a system to be self-configurable self-manageable can be realize
by a cooperative solution. For example, by adopting the cooperation among
the elements of a distributed system should increase the capability of the
system itself to isolate the inefficiencies of some elements.
The cooperative scheme seems to be the more fashionable solutions to
meet all the mentioned requirements. Generally we can claim that every
distributed system which requires a coordination can take advantages by
adopting a distributed collaborative solution.
Basement of any cooperative mechanism is the distributed information.
Every element usually perceives a kind of “limited vision” of world around
it. For this reason we have a sort of “local information” distributed in every
single node. By collecting all this information we can produce a “global” one.
We claim that by sharing global information we can improve local decisions
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and computations. Indeed, by merging local and global information it is
possible to observe a meaningful improvement in performance also for local
process. Isolated entity can improve it capability to take local decision by
collecting also data from several points into the network. Wherever a local
decision can influence global results of a system, it is important to collect also
data of the overall components of the system. This is usual for a cooperative
system.
By summarizing, we can claim that several benefit can be gained by
adopting a system design solution based on distributed information and co-
operation approach for improving the overall performance of system. A global
information as an aggregation of local experiences can result an advantage
for the effectiveness of a distributed system.
So we can conclude saying that the cooperation is an extraordinary mean
for developing people and machines.
1.2 Objectives
Cooperative approach is more and more exploited for improving the effective-
ness of distributed systems. As stated in the previous section, cooperative
solution seems to be conform to the requirements of all the systems char-
acterized by high dynamism, heterogeneity and vulnerability. Solutions for
network security, both in wired and wireless scenario, also should benefit
more from this approach. This is true whether we want to improve the ef-
fectiveness of existing network security systems by creating a collaborative
environments, or we want to study new solution and algorithms.
Every existing solutions, in fact, can benefit from using an approach that
allows them to share their results in order to improve the capability of iden-
tify correctly a threat. A distributed attack, indeed, can exploit the fact that
using multiple sources it can easily prevail over a single security system. For
example a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, a common threat for a network,
exploits the limited resources of a system to reduce the availability of it. A
distributed version of this attack can quickly exhaust the resources before a
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single system is able to report any anomalous situation. A solution based
on cooperation among single elements, instead, can contribute to detect at-
tacks opportunely and effectively. An isolate security system, indeed, could
easily identify an ongoing attack if it has evidences of the attack activities
coming from elements close the source. This can be consider an example of
“collaborative detection capability” where every local evidence of attack can
be supported by the remote ones.
An approach based on information sharing and cooperative computa-
tion can be also a useful mechanism to extend with security functionalities
traditional distributed protocol as routing algorithm. These protocols are
intrinsically cooperative so any secure approach can benefit from this pecu-
liarity.
Generally it is possible to identify three main reasons that suggest to
adopt a mechanism based on distributed information and cooperation in the
network security context.
Firstly some infrastructural weaknesses can affect meaningfully the se-
curity standard of any network environment. Sensor networks and wireless
mesh network, for example, are exposed to threats that can exploit the lack
of physical infrastructure to launch an attack. A malicious node can easily
take legitimate nodes’ place creating serious damages to the overall networks.
By allowing the nodes to exchange information about the anomalous situa-
tion we can obtain a good level of collaboration that can contribute to isolate
the malicious elements.
Solutions for network security are growing rapidly in the last years. Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDSs) and firewall are just some example of this evo-
lution. Such situation creates an heterogeneity of solutions and approaches
more and more sophisticate. These systems, even though efficient suffer
sometime to be “isolated”. A good solution could be to create a network
of security systems to enforce the capability to identify attacks by sharing
reports on the malicious activity of some users. We can connect IDSs and
firewalls in order to cooperate and improve their performance.
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The main reason for the growing interest of both academic and industrial
communities for adopting cooperative systems in the network security is the
wide diffusion of more and more sophisticated distributed attacks. The Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) are commonly exploited to launch threats
against a system. The cooperation is a good solution for mitigating the prob-
lem of distributed attack by means of a massive use of information exchange
among the elements of the network trying to properly limit the damages.
The analysis of several example of cooperative network security schemes
suggests that an integrated approach is required to better design such so-
lutions. A framework starting from the data collection of the traffic to the
methodologies to share information among the systems elements seems to be
more appropriate. This framework should also hold in due consideration the
peculiarity of the network infrastructure.
Provide a solution that takes into account a global vision of problems of
collaboration is one of the main challenges. In this work we want to investi-
gate some aspects of a cooperative system for security network stating from
a general approach which can be characterized to different security contexts.
We want to analyze the benefits of adopting a framework for distributed
collaborative system.
By identifying the essential requirements of a general cooperative ap-
proach based on distributed information we will prove the goodness of our
assumptions and their capabilities of generalization by applying them in two
different security contexts: the volume-based Denial-of-Service detection and
the secure optimization of routing protocol in wireless network.
In particular, in chapter 2 we will present the state of art of network se-
curity, focusing, in particular, on Denial-of-Service (DoS) threats and the
possible cooperative approach to properly defeat them. The main require-
ments for a collaborative system in the context of network security will be
dealt with in chapter 3, providing at the some time several design principles
that can be apply for every cooperative solution. Based on these principle in
chapter 4 and chapter 5 we will propose our distributed solution for detection
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of DoS. The same principle well be applied to design of a new secure routing
protocol for wireless mesh networks in chapter 6. Final considerations and
future work will conclude this work in chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Distributed Information for
Cooperative Network Security:
the State of the Art
In this chapter we propose a brief survey of existing methodologies and ar-
chitectures for cooperative network security. In particular, we want to in-
vestigate the current solutions related to the following well-known security
problems:
• volume-based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks,
• attacks to routing protocols for wireless networks.
These threats both aim to deny or restrict the legitimate usage of network
resources. They are widely discussed in the scientific community and present
a good margin of investigation.
We will analyze separately the state of the art in both fields. This analy-
sis reinforces our idea to exploit a cooperative approach based on distributed
information for their improvement. This survey will be the starting point for
further discussions and will serve as an introduction to our original contri-
butions.
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2.1 Security Issues in Networked Systems
The problem of security is one of the main challenges for a computer network.
In any networked system the need to share data coming from different points
increases irremediably the probability that information can be corrupted or
acquired by unauthorized users. Moreover, any distributed system requires
that each of its components works correctly and that it is always available in
terms of both data and service offered. All these problems require solutions
that allow to reduce the risk of tampering. Generally it is possible to define
some characteristics for network information and resources that must be
preserved by a security solution. Network security, indeed, is based essentially
on three components:
Confidentiality: It refers to the characteristic of data to be accessed ex-
clusively by authorized users. Bank accounts data are an example of
information which needs to preserve confidentiality.
Integrity: It refers to the capability to prevent the corruption and alteration
of data. It is important, for example, to assure data integrity during a
banking transaction.
Availability: Data must be protected against any attempt to reduce their
availability to legitimate users.
By summarizing, every time a remote user exploits network to require a
service, for example booking a flight or reserving a hotel room, he first needs
that the service is available, and then that his own private information, such
as credit card number, is protected against illegal eavesdropping attempts.
Likewise, the server needs to know the real identity of the user for bill ac-
counting and the user needs to know the identity of the server which he is
providing his own credit card number to.
Any security solution usually attempts to address one of these issues. It is
unthinkable, indeed, to propose a global solution to all these challenges. The
critical nature of the network security problem, together with the complexity
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of the single issues above stated above have suggested, during the last years,
to focus on specific solutions to specific problems.
The correctness of user authentication in conjunction with the data pri-
vacy and secrecy, usually referred to integrity and confidentiality require-
ments, are well assured by AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Ac-
counting) infrastructures [2] and cryptography algorithms [3]. The former
category is a framework capable to authentical users, handle authorization
requests, and collect accounting data. The AAA system can be considered
as the interface between a remote user and the resource it want to access.
A distributed system could not operate without a robust AAA server for
management of critical information.
Cryptography algorithms define a set of mechanisms and policies to assure
privacy and secrecy of data. By encoding the messages that pass through
the network, cryptography attempts to hide the real content of data.
Widely used in computer networks, these solutions are well-established,
and their general schemes are commonly adopted as de facto standards, as
well as new algorithms have been proposed along the years.
On the other hand, the availability of network resources and services of
remotely stored data, are not yet completely explored issues, and a standard
approach has not been proposed by the scientific community. In particular,
the problem of Denial-of-Service attacks has recently attracted the interest
of several research groups.
The DoS identifies an attack that prevents legitimate users from accessing
a specific network resource by exploiting some weaknesses of the available
infrastructure.
The lack of standard solutions is due essentially to the nature of the
network, and consequently the difficulty to efficiently detect and fight these
threats.
The current network technologies, either wired or wireless, are based on
the end-to-end paradigm [4]: the network provides just the forwarding data
process from the source to destination in a best-effort way, leaving to end
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users the problem of ensuring effectiveness and security of the communica-
tion. In its fundamental design, the forwarding process just provides fast
data transmission, considerably limiting elaborations on them. The largest
computation load is located at end users, legating to them also all the issues
related to security. If problems occur during an end-to-end communication,
no intermediate node can assume control to limit the damages. Furthermore,
attacks are usually launched by compromising some nodes in the network.
For this reasons any security strategy is unequivocally related to securing
each single part of the network, and this is impossible to assure.
For this reason only stable solutions for data privacy and profile authen-
tication are provided, thus neglecting the problems related to security inside
the network.Hence, DoS defence solutions are still open issues.
2.2 Denial-of-Service Attacks
Mirkovic et al. provide an interesting taxonomy for DoS, in particular for
distributed DoS (DDoS) [4]. Generally, several parameters can be considered
for DoS attacks classification. It is possible to discriminate them based on
degree of automation, attack rate dynamics or source address validity. The
most interesting classification criterion is based on exploited weaknesses : it is
possible to distinguish DoS in semantic and brute-force attacks. The former
exploit protocols features or application bugs run at victim is side to consume
resources and to deny to others their usage. TCP-SYN attack is an example
of semantic DoS attacks. The brute-force attack, instead, represents a DoS
attack performed by launching a huge amount of requests of service to victim
greater then it is able to handle in order to disrupt server’s functionality.
Some DoSs can fit both classes: for example a TCP-SYN attack could be
considered both a semantic and a brute-force attack.
Another interesting classification is based on victim type. The infrastruc-
ture attack, in particular, targets some distributed services that are critical
for network operations. An example of these attacks are attacks to DNS, or
against network core routers and routing protocols.
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A classification about the impact on the victim is also provided. We can
distinguish between disruptive effects and degrading effects. A disruptive
attack can completely deny access to victim is services to legitimate users.
These attacks might require a manual recovery of the victim by human in-
tervention, a self-recovery or semiautomated recovery, or, in the worst case,
they might lead to non-recoverable effects. Sometimes the attacks can have
marginal effects on victims. The degrading attacks attempt to consume a
portion of victim resources in order to limit the number of users that can use
them. Detection of these attacks is hard since they don’t deny completely the
victim services. The economical effects of these attacks also can be more dis-
astrous then disruptive attacks, since low customer satisfaction for a service
provided by a company can move their preferences to different provider.
As suggested in [4], unfortunately a rigid classification of DoS cannot
be provided and sometimes attacks can fall in different categories or newer
ones can require the definition of new classes. A DoS, indeed, identifies all
attempts to deny a service to users by compromising a resource provided by
the network. Any denial of service that involves some intermediate entities
or networks can be considered a DoS.
In this chapter we will focus exclusively on two types of DoS attacks:
Infrastructure Volume-based DoS attack and Routing protocol DoS attacks.
The latter, in particular, will be analyzed for wireless scenarios, where the
problem represents a critical challenge. The objective of this thesis is not to
provide an exhaustive solution to DoS defence. As stated previously, we want
to prove the applicability of cooperative solutions to improve the efficiency
of detection. We have chosen these problems since they represent the most
debated ones in the scientific community. Based on the same approach we
claim that mechanisms and results provided for these two threats can be
effectively extended to other specific DoS threats. We will discuss about this
at the end of this thesis.
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2.3 DoS Defensive Solutions
Any defence mechanism, a part from the specific DoS attack, is influenced
from several factors [4]. In particular, the nature of attacks, especially DDoS,
makes it essential to design distributed systems to face them. Leaving the re-
sponsibility to handle attacks just to the victims can create serious damages.
Cooperative solutions can better response to DoS and DDoS. In this way it
is possible to block the attack attempts further from the victim, thus reduc-
ing the risks. Moreover a distributed attack detection can make it easier to
apply a proper response. Unfortunately, since the networks are administered
by different entities, a fully distributed solution is not favourably accepted
by the entire scientific community.
The mechanisms for DoS defence are usually classified in two classes based
on the approach adopted to deal with the attack:
• preventive solutions,
• reactive solutions.
The first ones try to eliminate the potential system weakness exploited
by attackers during their actions. Resources redundancy, mechanisms for re-
siliency, secure code and protocol design, users accounting tools, are common
approaches adopted to prevent a DoS attack. Unfortunately this approaches
cannot assure the complete security of the network. A security strategy that
exclusively applies prevention policies can effectively operate only if all its
mechanisms work correctly; otherwise an attacker can exploit a fault in one
of its parts to bypass the active security strategy. For this reason both de-
tection and responsive solutions are essential.
Reactive solutions have the responsibility to mitigate the effects of one
attack in progress. They require firstly to detect the attack and then to
respond to it. From a complexity point of view, the main challenge of a
reactive mechanism is the attack detection. The well-known solutions to this
problem are based on the adoption of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
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Generally an IDS provides two fundamental tasks: (i) monitoring the traf-
fic data in order to discriminate the activities on the network; (ii) classifying
the monitored activity as normal or malicious.
The IDS is the critical component of a reactive strategy against DoS
attacks, so it has attracted a great interest from several researchers in the
last years. IDS systems have been largely studied and numerous solutions
have been proposed.
In the next section we will provide details on current solution for IDS.
Cooperative systems also will be dealt with.
2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems
The network monitoring and traffic inspection are critical tasks for a intru-
sion detection system. Generally an IDS provides network traffic monitoring
in order to identify inappropriate, incorrect or anomalous activity within a
system, be it a single host or a whole network. As like a “bouncer”, IDS ob-
serves the traffic passing through the network, discriminates among different
users by analyzing properly the different packets flows, and finally classifies
them in normal or malicious based on well-known classification criteria. All
this must be done in a transparent fashion, without interfering with legiti-
mate user activities.
Several IDS classification criteria have been proposed. Usually an IDS
can be grouped into three main categories:
• Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (N-IDS),
• Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (H-IDS),
• Stack-based Intrusion Detection Systems (S-IDS).
This classification depends on the information sources analyzed to detect
an intrusive activity. N-IDS [5, 6] analyze packets captured directly from the
network. By setting network cards in promiscuous mode, an IDS can monitor
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traffic in order to protect all of the hosts connected to a specified network
segment. On the other hand, H-IDS [7, 8] focus on a single host’s activity:
the system protects such a host by directly analyzing the audit trails or
system logs produced by the host’s operating system. Finally, S-IDS [9] are
hybrid systems, which operate similarly to a N-IDS, but only analyze packets
concerning a single host of the network. They monitor both inbound and
outbound traffic, following each packet all the way up the TCP/IP protocol
stack, thus allowing the IDS to pull the packet out of the stack even before
any application or the operating systems processes it. The load each IDS
must afford is lower than the total traffic on the network, thus keeping the
analysis overhead into reasonable bounds; hypothetically, each host on the
network might run a S-IDS.
Intrusion Detection Systems can be roughly classified as belonging to two
main groups as well, depending on the detection technique employed:
• anomaly detection,
• misuse detection,
• signature-based detection.
The first two techniques rely on the existence of a reliable characterization
of what is normal and what is not, in a particular networking scenario.
More precisely, anomaly detection techniques base their evaluations on a
model of what is normal, and classify as anomalous all the events that fall
outside such a model. Indeed, if an anomalous behavior is recognized, this
does not necessarily imply that an attack activity has occurred: only few
anomalies can be actually classified as attempts to compromise the security
of the system. Thus, a relatively serious problem exists with anomaly detec-
tion techniques which generate a great amount of false alarms. On the other
side, the primary advantage of anomaly detection is its intrinsic capability
to discover novel attack types. Numerous approaches exist which determine
the variation of an observed behavior from a normal one. A first approach is
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based on statistical techniques. The detector observes the activity of a sub-
ject (e.g. number of open files or TCP state transitions), and creates a profile
representing its behavior. Every such profile is a set of “anomaly measures”.
Statistical techniques can then be used to extract a scalar measure represent-
ing the overall anomaly level of the current behavior. The profile measure
is thus compared with a threshold value to determine whether the examined
behavior is anomalous or not. A second approach, named predictive pattern
generation, is based on the assumption that an attack is characterized by
a specific sequence, i.e. a pattern, of events. Hence, if a set of time-based
rules describing the temporal evolution of the user’s normal activity exists,
an anomalous behavior is detected in case the observed sequence of events
significantly differs from a normal pattern.
Misuse detection, also known as signature detection, is performed by clas-
sifying as attacks all the events conforming to a model of anomalous behavior.
This technique is based on the assumption that an intrusive activity is char-
acterized by a signature, i.e. a well-known pattern. Similarly to anomaly
detection, misuse detection can use either statistical techniques or even a
neural network approach to predict intrusions.
Signature-based detection is the most used to detect an attack. SNORT1[10]
and Bro2[5] are well-known systems based on this approach. Intrusions are
coded by means of a set of rules: as soon as the examined event matches one
of the rules, an attack is detected. A drawback of this approach is that only
well-known intrusive activities can be detected, so that the system is vul-
nerable to novel aggressions; sometimes, few variations in an attack pattern
may generate an intrusion that the IDS is not able to detect.
The main problem related to both anomaly and misuse detection tech-
niques resides in the encoded models, which define normal or malicious be-
haviors. Although some recent open source IDS, such as SNORT or Bro,
provide mechanisms to extend the detection ability of the system in order
to include either anomaly or misuse approaches[11, 12], behavior models are
1http://www.snort.org
2http://www.bro-ids.org
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usually hand-coded by a security administrator, representing a weakness in
the definition of new normal or malicious behaviors. Recently, many research
groups have focused their attention on the definition of systems able to au-
tomatically build a set of models. Data mining techniques are frequently ap-
plied to audit data in order to compute specific behavior models (MADAM
ID [13], ADAM [14]).
Data mining algorithm is referred to as the process of extracting specific
models from large stored data [15]. Machine learning or pattern recognition
processes are usually exploited in order to realize this extraction (SLIPPER3
[16]). These processes may be considered off-line processes. In fact, all the
techniques used to build intrusion detection models need a proper set of au-
dit data. The information must be labelled as either “normal” or “attack” in
order to define the suitable behavioral models that represent these two dif-
ferent categories. Such audit data are quite complicated to obtain. The data
set used for The Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
Tools Competition, the 1999 KDD data4 [13][17], is probably the most well-
known example of this kind of information, representing a processed version
of the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program database, collected
and managed by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The DARPA database con-
tains tcpdump data related to seven weeks of network traffic generated over
a military emulated LAN. KDD is filled with five million connection records
labelled as “normal” or “attack”.
2.5 Cooperative Solutions for Attacks Detec-
tion
The current “isolated” IDS solutions suffer from two major problems: the
high false alarm rate, and the “locality” of detection that limits the capability
of the system to properly face distributed and coordinated attacks as DDoS.
New distributed solutions for intrusion detection have been recently pro-
3http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/∼wcohen/slipper/
4http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/
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posed, supported also by the consideration that by correlating alerts it is
possible to reduce the false alarm rate [18].
In this section we deal with solutions for network security that have suc-
cessfully exploited cooperation and distributed information to improve the
ability of a system to properly detect attacks to the network. The common
feature of these systems is to define architectures that are independent of the
specific intrusion detection mechanism, since they just attempt to enlarge
the functionality of system and to increase the capability of detection by
adopting a coordinated and collaborative approach based on the exchanging
of security information. All of them usually adopt existing solutions for local
attack detention and try to increase the effectiveness of the overall process
based on the assumption that sharing evidences of attacks might provide a
clearer vision of the ongoing situation. This can improve the capability of
correct detection, through a decrease of both false positives and false nega-
tives, and thus bring to a prompt response.
2.5.1 DefCOM
The Defensive Cooperative Overlay Mesh (DefCOM) system, proposed by
the Laboratory for Advanced System Research (LASR) at University of Cal-
ifornia in Los Angeles (UCLA) [19], is a well-known example of distributed
system based on a cooperative approach to face the problem of distributed
DoS. Its architecture is shown in Figure 2.1. DefCOM is composed of het-
erogeneous defensive elements, organized in an overlay peer-to-peer network.
We can identify four different defensive elements in the architecture:
• Legacy Router,
• Core Defence Node,
• Classifier Node,
• Alert Generator.
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Figure 2.1: DefCOM Architecture
The core of the architecture is the Traffic Tree Discovery by which the
framework attempts to identify the victim-rooted traffic tree. When a DDoS
attack occurs, the alert generator detects it and sends an alertmessage to all
the nodes in the network, except those nodes that don’t forward traffic to the
attack target. All the nodes that observed the traffic directed to the target
are called active nodes. The nodes cooperate in order to identify the traffic
tree from attackers to victim by stamping the traffic. In particular, each
active node selects a stamp to place in the header of packets it forwards to
the victim, and communicates it to its neighbors in a secure way. Moreover,
an active node observes the stamps selected by its neighbor in order to create
a parent-child relationship; a node that observes the traffic stamped by its
neighbor becomes a “parent” and so it communicates to the neighbor its new
“child status” by explicit message. The security of the stamp exchanging
mechanism is assured by changing frequently the stamp and by a mix of
encryption and authentication mechanisms.
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Once the traffic tree from attackers to victim is identified, the defense el-
ements start to cooperate both to limit the traffic of attackers and to assure
correct treatment of the traffic of the legitimate users. The best solution re-
quires to apples rate limiting techniques as close as possible to the attackers
in order to reduce the risk to limit legitimate traffic. The rate limit is prop-
agated by the root of the tree to the defense elements closest to attackers.
Each node assigns an equal amount of its rate limit to its children and com-
municates this through a rate-limit request. The rate limit assigned by
a parent can be modified by a child in order to assure traffic to its legitimate
users: this is communicated by child through a resource request message
to parent.
The traffic statistics of each node are reported to root of tree in order to
allow it to determine the attack evolution and communicate this to the first
defense node that raised the alarm.
In order to provide differentiated services to legitimate and malicious traf-
fic each defense node maintains two stamps, approved stamp and monitored
stamp. A Classifier Node monitors the traffic and marks the legitimate traffic
with an approved stamp and all the other traffic with monitored stamp. If
no information about a traffic profile is known, a node could mark this traffic
as unknown. The rate-limit algorithm assigns the bandwidth resource firstly
to “approved” traffic, then to “monitored” one, and finally to “unknown”
traffic.
2.5.2 COSSACK
COSSACK is another distributed solution for automatic detection and re-
sponse to DDoS, proposed in the context of the YOID project at Information
Sciences Institute (ISI) [20].
As shown in Figure 2.2, the basic components of the architecture are the
watchdogs. Placed at the egress of each network, they are responsible for
scanning network topology in order to identify potential victims in the net-
work. They are also equipped with traditional IDS that are responsible for
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Figure 2.2: COSSACK Architecture
monitoring the traffic and discovering threats to its network. In normal con-
ditions the watchdog is dormant, while the IDS monitors the traffic network.
Once an alert is raised by the IDS related to a target host in its network, the
watchdog changes its status to ”awake” and creates a YOID multi-cast com-
munication group with the others watchdogs of the infrastructure. In this
way the watchdog alerts watchdogs close the attack source to adopt the suit-
able countermeasures to limit the effects of the attack. Once the source of
the attack is identified, the watchdogs instruct the related routers to enable
filtering on malicious traffic.
In order to reduce risk of source address spoofing, the watchdogs at source
networks monitor the outgoing traffic to identify spoofed addresses. Once
detected such an address, the watchdog checks for existence of YOID multi-
cast group related to spoofed source’s destination. At this point the watchdog
joins the group solving the problem of address spoofing.
2.5.3 Cooperative Defence against DDoS Attacks
Nodes cooperation is also the basis for Cooperative Defence against DDoS
Attacks (CoDeDDos) architecture [21], a distributed approach for defence
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Figure 2.3: CoDeDDoS Architecture
against distributed denial of service proposed by Zhang et al.
This architecture, shown in Figure 2.3, consists essentially of two stages.
At the first stage each system node detects the attack autonomously by
exploiting a variety of existing IDS solutions, for example Snort [10]. The
victim is protected by adopting a local rate limit on traffic directed to it from
a suspicious node, according to a local policy. Then, in the second stage each
node adjusts dynamically its rate limit according to the information shared
with others nodes in the infrastructure. The information exchange exploits
gossip communication mechanisms.
In the architecture proposed, each defence element is placed at the edge
router of an Autonomous System (AS) and monitors traffic locally to identify
DDoS attacks ongoing and in case limits their damages. Single elements are
connected by peer-to-peer overlay network; this allows them to exchange
information on attacks’ evidences.
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By adopting a set of metricsMi each node locally profiles the traffic mon-
itored. Based on these metrics the single element assigns to suspicious traffic
a confidence degree conf , weighting each metrics with its reliability in terms
of false positives or negatives. Thanks to such conf value, the node limits
suspicious traffic. Moreover, by using gossip communication mechanisms, it
provides his neighbor peers in the overlay network with information on the
suspicious traffic profile, the metrics values related to it, and its confidence
conf .Gossip communication, in particular, provides a “light” and reliable
mechanism for sharing information; it exploits solution based on well-known
epidemic theory algorithms. The data exchange on DDoS attack evidence al-
lows a more accurate process of traffic limiting by adopting algorithms that
aggregate information.
2.5.4 SABER
Proposed by Keromytis et al. [22], SABER (Survivability Architecture: Block,
Evade, React) integrates several defensive solutions in order to provide unique
coordinated architecture to detect and effectively face different kinds of at-
tacks. Basic idea is that isolated and uncoordinated solutions can fail to
react properly to all possible threats. An overview of SABER architecture is
shown in Figure 2.4.
SABER consists of different components, that it coordinates and selects
properly based on the specific threat that it has to face. The components
are:
DoS Resistent Architecture placed at the perimeter of network, rapidly
detects whether a service request is legitimate or not, hence limiting
the illegal resource usage;
Intrusion Detection tools , placed both inside and outside the network,
provide effective solutions to detect ongoing attacks;
Process Migration and Software Patching tools available inside the net-
work, to respectively: (i) a process to automatically suspend itself and
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Figure 2.4: SABER Architecture
to move to a more secure node; (ii) to reduce risk of vulnerability code
by an automatic application of patches.
Coordination and Control Infrastructure which allows the different com-
ponents to communicate and correlate themselves in a suitable way,by
adopting a distributed publish-subscribe event-based approach.
Each component of the SABER framework is provided with two differ-
ent mechanisms for communication: an alerts reports and a control accep-
tance. Information is exchanged through MEET (Multiply Extensible Event
Transport) that provides an efficient distributed architecture for the publish-
subscribe paradigm. The events coming from different components are col-
lected, managed and aggregated by XUES (XML Universal Event Service).
By using the coordination and control infrastructure, SABER is able to
activate the proper components to better respond to an attack attempt.
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2.5.5 ASSYST
Proposed by COMICS (COMputer for Interection an CommunicationS) Re-
search Unit at Federico II University of Napoli [23], Active Security SYSTem
(ASSYST) is a distributed solution for active network protection against
DDoS attacks, involving routers and exploiting a new protocol for informa-
tion exchange called Active Security Protocol (ASP).
In spite of traditional solutions for attack source traceback, ASSYST
avoids for marking packets, but exploits only information exchange among
network routers with the objective to go back up to attacker. Indeed, the
main ASP purpose is to provide a “light” solution for cooperation of network
elements involved in malicious activity.
An ASSYST router consists of the following components, as shown in
Figure 2.5:
Packet Classifier Intrusion Detection System which allows the detec-
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tion of an attack in progress;
Security Reference Monitor which manages the information needed by
others components cooperating;
Policy Response Process which manages the allocation of queues for at-
tack monitoring based on specific monitoring policy;
Coordination Engine which allows to orchestrate all the network elements
involved in the detection process;
Authentication Process needed for securely authenticate the cooperating
routers;
Active Security Process for the interaction with ASP;
Routing Process which is responsible for local routing operations.
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Figure 2.7: DOMINO Architecture
When a router detects suspicious activity it propagates an Alert mes-
sage to all the neighbor nodes with an identifier of attack session (Fig-
ure 2.6). Such information is summarized in unique IDSession and in a
TrafficDescriptor which describes the characteristics of the attack.
Upon reception of an Alert message, all routers start to monitor the
traffic based on the information contained in the TrafficDescriptor. If no
traffic with such features is detected the router replies to the source with
a NoPath message, otherwise it sends a RequestSession. Upon reception
of the RequestSession message, the router which started the process first
confirms the session and then delegates to upstream routers all monitoring
processes, since those routers are closer to the attack source.
Once an attack is over, the ASP protocol provides mechanisms to release
all resources allocated for the detection process.
2.5.6 DOMINO
Proposed by the University of Wisconsin [24], DOMINO (Distributed Over-
lay for Monitoring InterNet Outbreaks) provides a dynamic framework for
information sharing aimed at improving the intrusion detection capability of
a set of nodes located within the network.
It is possible to identify three different classes of components (Figure 2.7):
Axis Overlay It is the core of the DOMINO architecture. It provides an
overlay network for communication and information sharing among the
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elements of the architecture. It consists of several parts: the DOMINO
Access Point for external connectivity, the Active-Sinks, which simulate
virtual machines and which exploit unused IP address space to collect
data on attacks attempts (honey-pots), NIDS/Firewall for monitoring
activities of a local segment of network, the DOMINO Query Engine,
which creates an interface for importing and exporting the data about
intrusions, as well as for setting parameters, and the DOMINO Sum-
mary Exchange Protocol, which allows periodically exchange of reports
with information about intrusions.
Satellite Communities They are small networks or single nodes imple-
mented as local DOMINO systems. These communities are hierarchally
organized and communicate with the outside world through either an
Axis Node or a DOMINO satellite. Generally data obtained at satellite
level are less trustworthy then data collected at an Axis Node.
Terrestrial Contributers They identify nodes, usually NIDS or Firewall,
that don’t implement the DOMINO architecture but contribute to the
DOMINO system by providing daily reports on intrusions and port
scans.
Information sharing allows to aggregate local and global views of the in-
trusion activities. A Cooperative Intrusion Detection Module (CRIM) can be
exploied to merge information in order to have a global view of the situation.
This process can also be opportunely weighted.
2.5.7 Cooperative Anti-DDoS Entity
Cooperative Anti-DDoS Entity [25] is a modular software that offers to par-
ticipating domains both a communication and response coordination service.
The main objective is to create a community of cooperativing partners that
by exchanging security information are able to identify and respond to at-
tacks locally, without any traceback process.
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Figure 2.8: Deployment of Cooperative Anti-DDoS Entity
The basic component is the Entity, which operates as a high-level coordi-
nator of a local hierarchy of IDSs (Figure 2.8). By exploiting both informa-
tion of local IDSs and information coming by other peers in the community,
the Entity is able to infer about the presence of an ongoing attack. The En-
tity is also able to interact directly with a local IDS in order to temporarily
configure filters for DDoS suppression.
In normal conditions the Entities periodically transmit and receive mes-
sages that confirm their “aware status” to the community. When an Entity
receives an Alert message either from a local IDS or from another peer, it
moves to suspicious status. As soon as the number of Alerts exceeds a
threshold the Entity changes it status to alerted, and asks a management
console for the policy to be adopted related to these alerts. If a security
policy is needed, the Entity moves to the final status of reacting.
The communications within the community are allowed by means of a
multi-cast model, and messages exchanged are formatted according to XML
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [26].
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2.6 Security Issues in Wireless Networking
Scenario
Cooperation seems to be also the key strategy to prevent and reduce the
risk of attacks in a intrinsically weak infrastructure like a wireless network.
The lack of physical connectivity, indeed, represents a critical factor that
a malicious user can exploit to compromise the functionality of a wireless
network. Thanks to the “broadcast” nature of the wireless channel, malicious
packets can not be prevented from reaching some of the nodes as opposed
to wired networks where filtering policies at network access can easily be
applied to reduce the risks of malicious actions. Although authentication
processes can be exploited, in wireless network an intruder can more easily
obtain physical access. In this scenario some services, like the routing process,
become more exposed to attacks, and for this reason well-designed security
solutions are required.
As we will see in section 2.7 the cooperation among elements of a wire-
less infrastructure can prevent or limit some damages provided by malicious
activities, thus overcoming the intrinsic weakness of its fundamental func-
tionality. In the following we will discuss the possible risks coming from a
DoS in a wireless network, paying more attention to routing attacks.
In wireless scenarios DoS attacks represent much more serious threats
than in wired infrastructures. Although authentication, confidentiality and
integrity of data still play a fundamental role and can be achieved by adopting
traditional security mechanisms, DoS attacks deserve special attention, since
they can easily compromise functionality of the infrastructure.
The availability of low cost hardware, open-source software and public
access to ISM band (also adopted by IEEE 802.11), have made it easy to
launch a DoS attack to a wireless network compared. IEEE 802.11 technology
is an appealing target since it provides good connectivity range; Furthermore,
an intruder can reach a node undisturbed by using ISM band with a low cost
technology.
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Obviously the different wireless network technologies determine new threats
that exploit them. Although several mechanisms typical of wired scenarios,
(like volume-based DoS detection) can still be applied in a wireless context,
new solutions are required to properly handle new attacks.
The DoS attack to physical layer is just an example of these new threats.
The jamming problem, for example, exploits the peculiarities of wireless link
to compromise communication reliability. By jamming the channel with a
noise signal it is possible to reduce seriously the bandwidth availability of the
channel, thus limiting total throughput of the network. For this reason by
interfering with the radio channel these attacks can reduce the performance
of the network. The problem dramatically raises if the attack is launched
in strategic points of the network. In a wireless mesh network, for example,
performing signal interference in proximity of a gateway can irreparably com-
promise the communications of all the network. Unfortunately no effective
solutions have been provided to contrast physical layer attacks.
Differently from wired networks, wireless infrastructures are also partic-
ularly vulnerable to MAC layer DoS attacks. As for the physical layer, these
attacks can compromise the effectiveness of communication since the sharied
nature of the medium can allow an attacker to contend the MAC channel
with legitimate users.
Attacks to routing protocol are also a serious risk against correct function-
ality of wireless networks. As stated by Salem et al. in [27], the multi-hopping
nature of the most common wireless infrastructures (Ad-hoc Networks and
Wireless Mesh Network) makes routing a very important mechanism. For
this reason it is becoming an appealing target of more and more attack at-
tempts. Since the routing protocols are critical operations they require robust
and secure solutions. According to Pirzada et al. [28], “there is no advantage
in protecting the data if it never reaches its required destination”.
There are two sources of threats to routing protocols. The first is due to
“external attackers”. These threats usually attempt to limit the functionality
of routing by injecting incorrect routing information, modifying or destroying
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such information, or replaying old routing messages.
The second source of threats are the “internal attackers”. They usually
consist of compromised nodes that can exchange incorrect information with
the other nodes, block the process of forwarding when packets pass through
them or modify the forwarded data.
Detailed information about internal attackers is provided by Yih-Chun et
al. in [29]. They define a routing blackhole as a typical compromised node
that, by using forged routing messages, can attract traffic to it in order to
drop maliciously data packets. Typically this is performed by announced
short distance to destination. Sometimes an attacker can substitute a black-
hole with a grayhole that selectively drops packets. In particular it can
forward just routing packets, while dropping data packets. In this way it
joins the path discovery process but precludes nodes from reaching the des-
tination, once the grayhole is on the path selected. An attacker can also
intentionally announce a longer distance to a destination node in order to
avoid the forwarding data process through it. This attack is known as gra-
tuitous detour. In a wormhole attack, instead, a compromised node records
the data at one location, sends them by tunnelling to another compromised
node located in another place, and injects again packets from there in the
network. This attack can create serious problems to routing protocols by
denying its capability to find paths longer than one or two hops. By quick
dissemination of illegal ROUTE REQUEST messages which suppress any later
legitimate ROUTE REQUEST, a rushing attack might seriously compromise the
protocol routing process.
Fortunately, several solutions have been proposed to protect the routing
mechanisms in wireless context. According to the classification proposed in
section 2.3, it is possible to identify two typical approaches to the problem:
• prevention,
• detection and reaction.
Both of them require both information exchanging and the cooperation
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among nodes of the infrastructure.
Prevention mechanisms usually exploit private-key dissemination and cer-
tification authorities to ensure both the correctness and the reliability of the
routing information exchanged. Unfortunately, as stated previously, preven-
tion cannot assure the effectiveness of security in the network. Detection and
reaction approaches are still needed.
Several cooperative solutions for detection and reaction to routing proto-
col attacks will be presented in the next section.
2.7 Cooperative Solutions for Secure Rout-
ing in Wireless Networks
In this section we describe some solutions to detect and mitigate misbehavior
in routing protocols for wireless networks. Their main objective is to provide
a robust mechanism to select “secure paths” based on node trustworthiness
principles. As stated previously, the common feature of all these solutions is
cooperation.
2.7.1 Watchdog and Pathrater
Watchdog and Pathrater are two mechanism to detect and mitigate misbe-
havior in routing processes [30]. They have been designed to extend the
functionality of the well-known DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) [31] routing
protocol for mobile networks.
Watchdog is responsible for detecting nodes that don’t forward packets.
It is implemented at each node by maintaining a buffer with all the packets
forwarded recently, and by comparing packets in the buffer with the packets
heard by interface in promiscuous mode. If packet captured doesn’t match
the data in buffer or a packet remains in buffer a time longer than a timeout,
a fault event is added to the failure list for that node.
Implemented at each node Pathrater performs a path computation by
combining node misbehavior rating with data of the links. The path is se-
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lected by adopting a metric that is the average of nodes ratings along the
path: the highest metric path is chosen. The ratings are periodically com-
puted based on variation of nodes behavior.
2.7.2 CONFIDANT
CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeT-
works) [32] is an interesting solution for cooperation in an ad-hoc network to
reduce risks of attacks to routing protocols. CONFIDANT works as an ex-
tension of DSR routing protocol. The solution proposed is based on detection
of misbehavior and subsequent reaction to it: upon detection of malicious
behavior of a node, the system responds by blocking the forwarding process
of packets coming from that node. A sort of re-integration possibility, after
an “expiation” period, is offered to misbehaving nodes which return to work
correctly.
The cooperation is the main contribution of the CONFIDANT protocol.
It provides two mechanisms to detect malicious nodes:
• learning correctness of neighbor nodes behaviors from their direct ob-
servation;
• sharing information about malicious nodes with other components of
the network.
These two mechanisms allow the network to isolate nodes that don’t have
an “exemplary conduct”.
CONFIDANT consists of four components (Figure 2.9):
• the Monitor,
• the Reputation System,
• the Path Manager,
• the Trust Manager.
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Figure 2.9: CONFIDANT components
The Monitor is responsible to control behavior of neighbor nodes. In
a wireless network scenario the monitoring of neighbors is extremely easy
to perform. The intrinsic broadcast nature of a wireless link represents an
advantage to control the operation of a close node: the traffic sent by a
node can be sensed from all the others in signal range. In this way every
node controls its neighbor node and vice versa. This feature is fundamental
to implement any detection solution in a wireless networking scenario. The
CONFIDANT Monitor observes the behavior of neighbor nodes related to a
specific activity, for example the forwarding process or the routing messages
injection, and registers any deviation from a “normal conduct”.
The Trust Manager allows to create a distributed trust management.
When a node wants to advice others of a malicious neighbor, it sends an
ALARM. The receivers have to control the trustworthiness of the ALARM re-
ceived. For this reason the CONFIDANT Trust Manager is provided of sev-
eral components: an alarm table, for storing information about the alarms
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received, a trust table, containing the trust levels of nodes which are used to
access the trustworthiness of the alarm received, and a friend list, that pro-
vides information about the nodes that potentially can send an alarm, and
in which a node trusts.
CONFIDANT Reputation System is a distributed component responsi-
ble for management of nodes reputation. It is provided with a table where
all the reputation ratings are stored. Anytime node misbehavior evidences
are enough, the Reputation System modifies the rating for that node. The
update is computed by a function that merges the different evidences of a
misbehavior, by assigning different weights to respectively direct experience
and to other nodes observations.
The information produced by the Reputation System is used by the Path
Manager. The Path Manager is responsible to delete paths that contain
malicious nodes. Finally it manages path requests coming from malicious
nodes.
2.7.3 CORE
CORE (COllaborative REputation) [33], similar to CONFIDANT (Section 2.7.2),
is another solution for improving routing security in wireless scenarios through
a distributed reputation model. Adopted as reinforcement of DSR protocol,
CORE defines two different kinds of reputation:
• Subjective Reputation
• Indirect Reputation
The former is the reputation observed locally by a node with regard to
other nodes. By monitoring temporal evolution of node’s behavior, the sub-
jective reputation is computed by giving more relevance to past observations,
than to recent ones. This is because isolated misbehaving activities can occur
due to link breaks.
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The Indirect Reputation is reputation provided to a node from others. It
doesn’t come from direct observations but rather from observations of other
entities.
Subjective Reputation and Indirect Reputation are merged by means of
a weighted combining formula to compute a final value of reputation to be
adopted in DRS protocol.
The reputation model is provided with a Reputation Table (RT), which
contains information about the reputation of each node, and a Watchdog
Mechanism (WD).
The reputations in RT are updated only if a misbehavior is detected, as
well as only positive reputation value are disseminated during the distribution
phase.
Chapter 3
Requirements for a
Cooperative System based on
Distributed Information
In chapter 2 we presented several solutions for network security that adopt a
cooperative approach based on exchanging information. The results confirm
that cooperation can considerably improve the performance of the overall
system. A security solution can benefit from exchanging information since it
can contribute to elaborate a better perception of critical events in progress,
and so a suitable reaction policy is possible.
The importance of security application requires cooperative systems that
own some fundamental characteristics, by means of which the system can
correctly and effectively operate.
In this chapter we will briefly analyze the main requirements for a coop-
erative security solution. We want to provide useful considerations that can
be exploited to correctly design these systems. This analysis allows us to
propose a global framework for designing and testing approaches to network
security based on distributed information.
Firstly we want to justify from a theoretical point of view the need of a
distributed solution to security. Several technical aspects of system compo-
nents will also be considered.
Based on these assumptions, in the next chapters we will present our solu-
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Figure 3.1: Model for Cooperative System
tions for cooperative detection of volume-based DoS attacks and for securing
routing protocol.
3.1 Advantages of Cooperation: A Simple An-
alytical Model
The effectiveness of a cooperative system is well supported by several solu-
tions. Every solution proves the goodness of its design by empirical analysis,
but it doesn’t always provide a theoretical analysis to justify the choices
adopted.
Based on a simple idea of cooperative systems, in this section we want to
justify from a theoretical point of view that the performance of such a system
improves by adopting a distributed approach to attack detection. We will
prove it by using the Information Theory. The model can be easily extended
to several cooperative solutions for network security.
The proposed system model consists of two nodes, i and j, with an iden-
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tical scheme to detect anomalies in network traffic. Each node provides a
first elaboration to summarize some features of the monitored traffic, and a
classification process to identify anomalies in the data. No assumptions have
been made on the features extraction process and classification in order to
provide a model as general as possible.
Let us consider an attack event as a random variable A, which takes value
1 if an attack is in progress, 0 otherwise. The discrete probability distribution
of the attack is
p(a) =
{
1− p if a = 0,
p if a = 1.
(3.1)
Based on Information Theory, the a priori uncertainty on the presence of
the attack is given by the entropy of the variable A
H(A) = −p ∗ log(p)− (1− p) ∗ log(1− p) (3.2)
Given a probability distribution, the entropy defines how much is the
uncertainty on variable classification: if p = 1 or p = 0 the uncertainty is 0.
By considering a new random variable Yi, an elaboration of the data traffic
provided by the features extraction process, as input of the classifier at node
i, it is possible to observe a decrease in the uncertainty on the variable A.
Generally, indeed, we can state that:
H(A|Yi) ≤ H(A) (3.3)
This proves that the classification process might be improved by an elab-
oration on the data independently from the classifier adopted. The equality
only holds if the variables A and Yi are independent. This just means that
if Yi does not carry information about the variable A then it cannot reduce
the uncertainty on A, otherwise it gives us more information to reduce the
uncertainty.
Let us now focus on the cooperative elaboration of data. Let Yj be the
traffic data extracted at node j, and X a random variable representing an
estimate of the variable A provided by node i. Generally, we can state that
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H(A|Yj, X) ≤ H(A|Yj) (3.4)
with equality only if A and X are independent given Yj, i.e. if
Pr(A = a|X = x, Yj = y) ≤ Pr(A = a|Yj = y) (3.5)
Based on these results, we claim that if node j also receives as input
to the classification process an estimate X of the attack event A provided
by node i, we might further reduce the uncertainty on event A, unless the
information carried by X about A is already contained in Yj. In such a case,
we don’t have a decrease in the uncertainty on A, but anyway the probability
of bad classification does not increase.
Generally, the conditional entropy H(A|Z) is related to the error of esti-
mate
Aˆ = g(Z) (3.6)
By adopting Fano’s inequality [34] for the binary random variable A,
indeed, we can state that:
Pr(error) = Pr(Aˆ 6= A) ≤ H(A|Z) (3.7)
We have thus proved that, by reducing the error probability in the classi-
fication of malicious activities, a cooperative system might improve its per-
formance with respect to a centralized approach. At least, the performance
doesn’t degrade when the information exchange is related to different events.
By exploiting an estimate of A provided by node i, which represents the
result of a local elaboration, at node j we conclude that the uncertainty on
the attack variable A at j decreases, improving in this way its capability of
events detection.
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3.2 Exchanged Data
The results about the opportunity to exploit a cooperative approach for net-
work security introduce the problem to determine what kind of information
nodes need to exchange in order to improve considerably the network security
operations. As stated in Section 3.1, indeed, a notable result for distributed
detection can only be observed if the data exchanged are statistical depen-
dent. A statistical independence of data, as shown by equation 3.5, does not
add useful information in order to reduce the uncertainty on the classifica-
tion process of the variable A. This might happen if X provides an estimate
of a variable A∗ completely independent from variable A. In distributed de-
tection, for example, a node i might provide node j with information related
to observations of other traffic patterns that node j itself observes.
This raises two problems related to the effectiveness of a distributed sys-
tem: what kind of information we need to share, and which partners a node
must send information to. In the following we will discuss about the first
issue, providing an analysis of node partners selection in section 3.3.
Since an attack uses the network to perform its action, it is possible
to observe its so called “footprints” in several points through the network.
Furthermore, a distributed attack leaves more pronounced“footprints”, even
if its “form” could change from a location to another, since an attack could
aggregate its multiple evidences in some network points. Fortunately, this
can only contribute to enforce the certainty of the attack.
Apart from the type of attack, it can be perceived as a “network phe-
nomenon”. The evidences of it, its location and its variation are not random
features, but they meet a well-known logic summarized in the following two
fundamental characteristics:
• spatial proximity,
• temporal proximity.
If an observer senses a phenomenon, it is very likely its spatially close
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observer senses the same event too. We define spatial proximity this char-
acteristic. Furthermore, if an observer detects a phenomenon at time t, it is
very likely it is going to observe the same event after a fraction of time, for
example at time t+ δ. This peculiarity of network attacks is called temporal
proximity of attack events.
The proximity features reflect in temporal and spatial correlation of the
observations of a phenomenon provided by multiple sources. In particular,
we can summarize these as follows:
Spatial Correlation Spatially proximal node observations are highly cor-
related. The degree of correlation increases with internode spatial sep-
aration, for example hops distance.
Temporal Correlation The degree of correlation between consecutive node
observations may change according to temporal variation characteris-
tics of phenomenon.
Proximity peculiarities could be considered for selecting what kind of
information to share. Spatial and Temporal correlations assure that the data
exchanged are not independent. By adopting appropriate merging algorithms
it is possible to exploit these data peculiarities to reduce the uncertainty of
the classification process and to improve global performance of system.
3.3 Data Dissemination Process
Data dissemination concerns the problem to exchange information among
nodes. Clearly this is a fundamental issue since the cooperation is based
exclusively on the node capability to share data.
The design of a suitable protocol for dissemination must satisfy several
requirements, directly connected to the specific security application that we
want to realize, and the performance that this application needs to achieve.
The mechanism proposed might be the result of a trade-off among these
conflicting requirements.
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Generally it is possible to identify four fundamental characteristics as
follows:
• peer selection;
• time of reporting;
• interference with normal network operations;
• speed of dissemination.
A dissemination protocol requires to properly select a set of peers which
a node sends information to. This process is closely related to the security
application served. Not all partners of network could be interested in receiv-
ing data from a remote location. Sometimes only a limited number of them
are really involved in the cooperation process.
The principle of proximity seems a good solution to be effectively ex-
ploited for defining the best solution to adopt. By using the spatial proxim-
ity, for example, the right set of nodes to involve in dissemination process
can be selected.
Several solutions have been proposed. Peer-to-peer communication par-
adigm is usually exploited. This might be the best solution if the security
application knows exactly which peer to send data to. Otherwise a broad-
cast solution could be implemented. This approach maximizes the number
of peers involved in the dissemination process, and it could be adopted when
a specific security application requires an event that is known by all partners
of community. Intermediate solutions can also be realized. Multi-cast com-
munication paradigm is widely exploited for existing cooperative approaches.
This implies that a node must have the capability to identify partners that
could be involved in a cooperation process. Furthermore, this process must
be dynamic and based on specific events that require cooperation. An alter-
native solution could be to select partners by using a probabilistic approach.
Each node selects a set of nodes to which to send data based on the prob-
ability that those nodes are actually involved in the attack. This solution
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seems to be the approach when a node does not know exactly the peers that
could be involved.
Another basic parameter that characterizes dissemination protocols is the
time of reporting. Also this parameter is closely related to the security ap-
plication that we want to implement, and it could considerably influence the
protocol design. Reporting time concerns the time at which the dissemina-
tion protocol is exploited to share the information. Clearly the reporting
time problem is closely connected to the problem of data synchronization
among peers.
Some applications could require to send information periodically at regu-
lar interval T . Usually these applications do not have real-time constraints on
cooperation, so a periodic reporting is enough for assuring the functionality
of cooperation.
Sometimes an event-driven reporting solution might be needed. Some
cooperative approaches, indeed, require to respond promptly to critical situ-
ations. The cooperation request could be closely connected to the evolution
of threats, and for this reason pseudo real-time solutions must be adopted.
Every time an attack event evolves a cooperation request could be raised.
Similarly, event-driven reporting sometimes could be triggered by applica-
tion events themselves, instead of threat events.
Finally, some security applications have a strictly real-time reporting con-
straint. The evolution of monitoring parameters related to a malicious ac-
tivity, for example, could be continuously communicated to partners in the
effort to cooperate for a distributed attack detection.
Clearly this is just a general classification of possible approaches for re-
porting time in cooperative security systems. Several applications exploit
hybrid solutions based on their specific requirements.
Connected with the reporting time is the problem of interference of dis-
semination protocol with normal network operations. Traffic overhead is
introduced by the protocol and it increases with the frequency of data re-
porting. The information we want to disseminate and its size in terms of
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bytes could affect the interference degree of the protocol. For this reason
the protocol design and implementation face a trade-off between the fre-
quency and information exchanged, which directly influences the effectiveness
of cooperative actions, and the interference with normal network operations.
Since security applications are critical for network dependability, sometimes
it might be better to introduce a higher overhead in order to have excellent
performance of the cooperative system.
The problem of overhead could be partially solved by using existing pro-
tocols for spreading information to partners. This requires the dissemination
process to be driven by an existing protocol itself. Fortunately, sometimes
this is possible, in particular when a cooperative approach extends security
functionalities of existing network mechanisms.
The last parameter that characterizes the data exchanging process is the
speed of dissemination. Connected with the time of reporting, this parameter
defines how long the information takes to reach all partners of community.
Sometimes the spatial proximity principle is not enough to create a proper
protocol. The application could require that information, after an elaboration
by each node traversed, reaches the widest number of partners. This happens
usually when an existing protocol is adopted or a virtual chain of peer is
involved for security application.
3.4 Data Aggregation Process
Another important issue for the correct design of a cooperative system is
the mechanism for data aggregation. Clearly, this process depends on the
specific data that the system exchanges, and the specific application that the
distributed framework implements.
The elaboration degree of data coming from partners can change based on
applications. Some of them, indeed, use data coming from partners only as
an input for triggering operations or applying local policies. No complex data
elaborations are required, and so no aggregation of information is effectively
performed.
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On the other hand, sometimes to reinforce locally evidences applications
perform an elaboration of the data received. Algorithms that temporally cor-
relate local data with external data are examples of this process. Usually this
aggregation process exploits statistical elaboration which is referred to as In-
formation Fusion. Information fusion concerns the techniques for merging
data from multiple sources despite differing conceptual or contextual repre-
sentations.
The objective of aggregation is to have a more accurate vision of the
reality occurring in the network, in order to improve the detection and reac-
tion to specific anomalies. Statistical correlation or data mining process and
multi-classifiers solutions seem to meet this requirement.
Any data aggregation approach requires suitable performance evaluation
criteria. Since aggregation in our context has the main objective to improve
the security of network, some typical performance parameters of it or classi-
fication processes could be adopted to evaluate the data fusion process. False
positive rate or false negative rate are analyzed to verify the goodness of ag-
gregation process, and in general improvements of adopting a cooperative
solution.
Other performance parameters could be exploited related to the network
functionalities themselves, in spite of cooperative applications. Since some at-
tacks attempt to reduce effectiveness of infrastructure, network performance
parameters could be evaluated. The service availability time or number of
users that at the same time require a service are well-known parameters to
exploit to verify the solution performance.
3.5 Cooperation, Reliability and Trustworthi-
ness
At this point it is clear that cooperation can definitely assure improvements
for network security, but, at the same time, it could introduce some risks,
since when several partners participate for a common purpose the probability
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of misinformation among them is very high. The main risks come from the
following observations:
• heterogeneity of components cooperating,
• local information more reliable than remote one,
• heterogeneity of events perceived by partners,
• risk of misbehavior of partners.
Usually cooperative systems exploit different components performing het-
erogeneous techniques in order to increase the effectiveness of action. Al-
though this can certainly yield benefits, it could introduce some risks. By
adopting different detection techniques for IDS, for example, cooperative
detection process could be compromised. An anomaly detection technique
performs zero-day attack identification better then a misuse detection, which
could ignore them. A solution able to limit the opposing effect of these two
techniques is needed to increase the effectiveness of the system.
Whenever two partners cooperate, the information exchanged might be
weighted in different ways. Usually the local information is more reliable
that the remote one, since a node is sure for its information generated lo-
cally, but it could have some “doubts” about that from partner. It comes
directly from the human behavior, where the one’s own opinions are more
important than the opinion of the others. This is true also in cooperating sys-
tems. In statistical aggregation processes, for example, the local information
might be weighted more then the remote one, in order to avoid generation
of misbehavior analysis.
In a cooperative system events observed by partners could be contrast-
ing, since they are placed widely through the network. Each event is strictly
correlated to the local context where it happens so judgments could be in-
fluenced by this peculiarity. For limiting the effects of information coming
from location “marginal” with respect to the event, a solution that takes into
account the locality of information by weighting suitably them is needed.
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Finally for the perfect cooperative system we need the assumption of “loy-
alty” of all the partners. This is true for a “perfect world”, not for the real
networks, where the threats and risks increase more and more. The trust-
worthiness is a fundamental component of a cooperation, in particular for
a critical application as network security. Some partners could be subvert-
ing themselves, and this could seriously compromise the performance of the
overall system. A cooperative security solution is weak to malicious node
misbehaver so a model limiting the effects of this nodes is required. The
solutions commonly adopted are based on partners trustworthy and reputa-
tion.
Chapter 4
A Framework for Intrusion
Detection
Any cooperative approach to network security requires several mechanisms in
order to operate correctly. By analyzing all solutions presented in chapter 2,
it is possible to identify four essential components (Figure 4.1). First, local
agents are needed, which locally analyze network events by monitoring and
classifying data. Existing solutions and mechanisms as IDS are usually ex-
ploited and integrated in the cooperative framework. Then, a dissemination
protocol that allows agents to exchange information about their local situa-
tion is also a fundamental “ingredient”. In order to exploit data coming from
different sources, a cooperative system requires mechanisms for data aggre-
gation. Finally common reactive policies are designed for limiting damages
due to attacks.
Keeping in mind the necessity of these “essential ingredients”, as an-
nounced in chapter 1, we want to provide our original contributions to net-
work security by proposing a cooperative approach to secure detection and
reaction to DoS, in particular volume-based and routing protocol attacks.
The peculiarities of these two attacks and the different context in which they
operate suggested us to deal with them separately, even if the some con-
ceptual principles discussed in the previous chapter 3 are common to both
solutions. In the following two chapters we will deal with the problem of
volume-based DoS, by proposing our original solution; a cooperative system
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for routing protocol attacks detection in wireless scenarios will be in turn
dealt with in chapter 6. Specifically in this chapter we will focus on our pro-
posal for a framework for IDS based on traffic monitoring and classification
of events by means of data mining techniques.
4.1 An Approach to Intrusion Detection
The work of an IDS consists in analyzing and classifying raw network traffic.
Based on its analysis and classification processes, the system can be ascribed
to one of the classes of IDS described in section 2.4.
Despite the inherent differences among IDS classes, some common build-
ing blocks can be identified, with respect to the high level functionality
needed for fulfilling the task of detecting intrusions. Such components, de-
picted in Figure 4.2, are:
Monitor: a component is needed which can read data and convert them to
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a format which is compatible with the one required from the classifier.
The conversion into such a format sometimes involves the extraction of
some parameters of interest aimed at synthesizing the properties of the
data which are of greater interest for the problem at hand. In the case
of the proposed intrusion detection system, network packets are usually
decoded, all the header fields are evaluated, and a set of traffic features
are computed, related to some statistical properties of the traffic.
Classifier: once data are modeled into a common format, they need to be
analyzed and classified. In principle, the classifier component of such
an IDS might be independent of the type of data. It needs to be aware
of a set of criteria aimed at detecting some particular properties in the
analyzed data and, when at least one out of such criteria is matched,
notify an entity about the occurrence of such an event. If each criterium
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is associated with the most likely cause which might have generated the
event it’s related to, the analyzer not only is able to notify in case of
the occurrence of some particular events, but it is also able to ascribe
such events to a generating cause, thus enabling the classification of
each reported event.
Event Notifier: any time the classifier reports the occurrence of some
events, it is necessary to enable the whole system to communicate with
the external world, in order to allow the notification of such occur-
rences. The event notifier is in charge of interpreting the results of the
analysis and correctly formatting the messages required for communi-
cating with the system users.
The detection process involves a set of classification criteria and relies on
the definition of a suitable behavior model. Thus, the IDS requires that a
proper representation of the user’s behavior is inferred from network data
by the monitoring module. This process can be realized through a careful
analysis of the network traffic and it is more complicated in a real-time
scenario, where great volumes of traffic have to be analyzed as quickly as
possible in order to reduce packet losses. Moreover, user’s behavior is also
needed to define the set of classification criteria used by the classifier to
identify anomalous activities.
According to this requirement, it is possible to identify two main chal-
lenges in IDS development:
• real-time extraction of user’s behavior from network traffic;
• definition of a suitable behavioral model to be used in the detection
process.
Commonly used IDSs typically analyze packets captured from the net-
work, finding in the current packet the signature of an attack in-progress.
However, malicious activity cannot be detected by examining just a single
packet: some types of attacks generate in a certain time interval a great
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amount of packets belonging to different sessions. Hence, an efficient detec-
tion needs statistical parameters taking into account the temporal relation
between sessions. These parameters collectively describe the user’s behavior.
Therefore, in a real-time process we have to associate a set of parameters,
i.e. a “pattern”, with each packet. Patterns include information related to
the single packet, as well as to the connection which the packet belongs to,
and to all the connections sharing some properties with the current one. This
is needed in order to retrieve information about “network context”, which is
a fundamental ingredient needed to correctly infer the behavior of a single
user.
As it is clear, the user behavior extraction process involves a heavy com-
putation load; moreover, suitable data structures have to be adopted in or-
der to compute the needed parameters. With regard to the behavioral model
used to classify users with respect to potential malicious activities, two differ-
ent approaches can be embraced. The former can be defined as a “punctual
classification” approach. According to this criterium, every single model is
able to classify a specific user behavior: for example, every network attack is
codified by means of a “signature”. Usually, every attack signature is repre-
sented by a rule (rule-based systems). Unfortunately, the definition of a rule
for every attack is not an effective solution. On one hand, this approach is
not able to detect novel attack patterns; on the other hand, the definition
of new attacks has a negative impact both on the computation load and on
the average time required to analyze every single packet (hence, the related
packet loss problem). Recently, in order to overcome the above mentioned
drawbacks, a new “non-punctual” approach to intrusion detection has been
adopted, based on the concept of “behavior generalization”: each classifica-
tion model generalizes the fundamental properties of a set of potential user
behaviors. For this reason, every model used in the classification process is
able to identify a set of attacks sharing common properties. This generaliza-
tion approach involves methodologies belonging to the data mining research
area. When applied to Intrusion Detection, data mining algorithms can be
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exploited to encode models which define normal or malicious behaviors.
In order to meet the above requirements, we have developed a framework
for intrusion detection exploiting pattern recognition techniques so that novel
attacks can be identified [11]. The reference framework is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: A Framework for Intrusion Detection
The overall model is composed of two parts: the former is a real-time
intrusion detection system which monitors and classifies network traffic based
on well-known user behavioral models; the latter is a pattern recognition
process, which extracts such behavioral models from pre-elaborated network
traffic, and consists of a database of labeled network traffic features, together
with a set of pattern recognition algorithms.
In particular we execute off-line elaborations on a suitably chosen data
set in order to extract a set of behavioral rules; such a set is then used in the
real-time classification process realized by the IDS.
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4.2 TrafficMonitoring: a Behavioral Network
Engineering Problem
The on-line system presents some operational blocks which perform the func-
tionality described for a canonical IDS architecture. The lowest block is the
monitor module. Connected directly to the network infrastructure, the mon-
itor firstly performs the sniffing task, capturing and decoding in a human-
readable data all the packet on the wire. Then, it elaborates the captured
packets in order to extract higher level information; such information, com-
monly called connection features, is needed to improve the behavioral classi-
fication process. The connection features represent a summarization of the
network user behavior. The greater the capability of the set of features to
discriminate among different categories, the better the classifier.
Usually there are three levels at which feature sets may be defined:
• The features may be referred to the single packet captured from the
network: although this set is easy to compute, it is not able to identify
all the potential attack types.
• A set of features related to the entire session which the packet belongs
to may also be defined: this is due to the fact that some intrusions may
be realized by means of a sequence of packets belonging to either the
same connection or different connections.
• The computed set of features may perform a statistical analysis of the
relation between the current session and the other ones: this is needed
in order to capture intrusions which affect the interrelation among dif-
ferent sessions.
The data aggregation process is probably the main task for the moni-
toring module. Extracting information of users’ habits can clearly influence
the classification stage. Thus, modelling correctly the network activities be-
comes a critical issue for an IDS. In order to design a proper solution for
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monitoring we identify some principles for users’ behavior extraction that we
called Behavioral Network Engineering [35]. Although we adopted it in an
intrusion detection context, such principles can be easily extended to all ap-
plications that requires to discriminate users’ behaviors for their operations.
In the following we will provide some details about such approach.
Firstly we observe the strict correlation between a user’s behavior and
network resource usage anytime the user asks for a service. Thus it becomes
of fundamental importance to get information on users habits in order to op-
timize all network operations. Generally, Behavioral Network Engineering
aims at exploiting data about user’s behavior to effectively manage, secure
and dimension the network. The knowledge of user’s habits represents a valu-
able input for the Behavioral Network Engineering black-box, which also uses
information about the current overall network status to define the proper ac-
tions to be performed onto the network. Therefore, both situation awareness
and user profiling contribute to produce behavioral information needed to
make the network secure (Figure 4.4).
The wide deployment of more and more complex services and applica-
tions over the Internet imposes a new approach for characterizing all po-
tential threats coming from either accidental events or malicious users [36].
According to the new paradigm named Autonomic Communication [37], net-
work users can be grouped into communities, each community representing
a set of entities sharing some features and interests and cooperating in or-
der to reach a well-defined objective. Clearly an IDS needs to know what
all users are doing, in order to effectively face the threats carried out by the
malicious ones. Moreover, this information must also take into account the
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relationships among the sets of users sharing common features, resources and
purposes. Unfortunately, the current real-time intrusion detection systems
do not adopt any user characterization including such “inter-user” infor-
mation. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), for example, is generally
realized through coordinating activities involving actors which are widely dis-
tributed throughout the network. According to this property, we claim that
the detection of such attacks also requires the knowledge of information re-
garding the “cooperation” among different network entities. Such entities
share the same “purpose” (i.e. the compromission of either a service or a
single host) and make use of the same resources (e.g. those belonging to the
network infrastructure) in order to fulfill their task. For this reason, the set of
hosts involved in a DDoS attack can be considered as a “community”, whose
members all aim to achieve the same result. Thus, the information about
this community as a whole can also contribute to gain a deeper knowledge,
i.e. the behavioral information, needed to improve the detection process.
Keeping in mind the assumptions on Behavioral Network Engineering
principles, we can define the main requirements imposed by intrusion detec-
tion to a monitoring framework.
From the implementation standpoint, the tasks required to a monitoring
module in the context of intrusion detection are:
• packets classification and data aggregation,
• behavior extraction.
A common way of classifying packets is grouping them in flows. Generally,
a traffic flow is referred to as “a set of packets passing at a network point
during a time interval and having common properties”. This is a general
and flexible definition allowing even a single packet, or a few packets to be
considered as a flow.
User behavior is described by some parameters, the so-called metrics,
which are measured by analyzing the properties of the observed packets.
In order to increase the required flexibility of the entire monitoring system
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and, therefore, its capability to support different kinds of security application
approaches, metric definition should be a process driven by users through,
for example, the use of suitable programming interfaces.
Thus, any monitoring framework should perform the following operations:
• capturing packets from the network,
• associating them with a flow by enabling a customizable flow definition,
• updating data records containing flow-related metrics
Measured data are, then, collected in order to make them available to the
classification process.
Traffic flows which are of interest to an IDS can be classified in two main
categories: fine-grained flows and coarse-grained flows. Fine-grained flows
refer to traffic generated by a single user or a small set of users and are
monitored in order to detect specific kinds of attack. On the other hand,
coarse-grained flows transport information describing network context and,
then, they are analyzed with the aim of identifying widely distributed at-
tacks such as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Such flow classification
inspires the metric definition and computation process in the sense that de-
pending on the attacks to be identified the IDS requires monitoring system
to measure specific metrics on a given class of flows.
We introduce two vectors: the vector of fine-grained metrics, named M f ,
and the vector of coarse-grained metrics, named M c(see Figure 4.5). For
each flow, either the vectorM f or the vectorM c will be produced depending
on the flow granularity. Starting from these vectors, the intrusion detection
system extracts the “context”, i.e. a synthetic view of the overall network
status.
Therefore, according with a Behavioral Network Engineering approach,
the implementation of an intrusion detection system implies developing a
context extraction algorithm whose inputs are the vectors M f and M c and
whose output is a new vector, called Mw. This algorithm uses both living
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Figure 4.5: Behavioral Extraction for Intrusion Detection
and timed-out behavior user metrics, since both the current state and the
recent history of the network concur in determining the context.
Finally,Mw andM f are inputs to an intrusion detection algorithm check-
ing whether or not the analyzed flow is an attack. This algorithm is interested
in analyzing only living metrics as its task is to trigger a prompt operation on
the network. A background classification process involving timed-out flows
can be useful to provide forensics as well as to help perform “context” mea-
surements.
In order to better illustrate the proposed approach we provide an example
of what M f , M c and Mw can represent in a particular attack scenario.
Let us suppose we are interested in detecting denial of service attacks
against a certain server. We define two kinds of flows: a fine-grained, bidi-
rectional flow, identified by the 4-tuple (source IP address, source port, des-
tination IP address, destination port), and a coarse-grained flow composed
of packets having as destination address the server’s IP address. Vector M f
is computed on the fine-grained flows and reports the number of bytes to-
gether with TCP connection status per flow. On the other side, vector M c is
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computed on the coarse-grained flows and contains the number of bytes per
flow.
Let us notice that the number of bytes received by the server can be also
inferred from the sum of all bytes related to fine-grained flows having the
server as destination. However, it is more straightforward to evaluate such
metric by directly monitoring coarse-grained flows, even though this implies
moving computation task in the monitoring system. With reference to our
example, a possible context extraction algorithm performs a two-fold task: on
one hand, it determines whether server bandwidth utilization is anomalous
and, on the other, computes the percentage of flows and the percentages of
received bytes per server port number. Such information is reported in vec-
tor Mw. In order to determine anomalous server bandwidth utilization daily
statistics are needed. As the usage of a server can vary over the 24 hours of
a day, the algorithm compares data contained in vector M c with historical
information to detect anomalies in the server bandwidth utilization. Then,
vector Mw, which reports a measure of the level of anomaly in the server
bandwidth utilization and the distribution of the port utilization in terms of
flows and bytes, describes the overall context and drives the intrusion detec-
tion algorithm in identifying malicious flows. More precisely, the intrusion
detection algorithm analyzes the context vector and decides whether every
single fine-grained flow has to be checked in order to detect specific attacks.
For example, a deeper analysis performed by the intrusion detection algo-
rithm might consist in controlling the status of a TCP connection. If the
client has sent a SYN packet without replying to the server’s SYN/ACK,
then such a behavior might be hiding an attack; therefore, the IDS analysis
should trigger an immediate counteraction on the network.
4.3 A Traffic Monitor for IDS
In order to support our framework for traffic monitoring, we implement a
system that responds the requirement stated in the previous section [38].
The overall structure is shown in Figure 4.6.
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DiFMon (Distributed Flow Monitoring) is in charge of capturing packets
from the network, associating them with a flow, by the means of a customiz-
able flow definition, and updating a record containing flow-related metrics.
Measured data are, therefore, collected in order to make it available to an
IDS classifier. The system architecture comprises a module that stores all
the flow records related to living flows, where a living flow is a flow which
is still receiving packets before a timeout occurs. The main issue concern-
ing this task is represented by the fact that the number of living flows is
very high (up to millions) and the packet inter-arrival time is very short on
high speed links. This implies that the time interval spent to search for the
record associated with a captured packet can be longer than the packet inter
arrival time, in case of a huge number of flow records. For this reason we de-
cided to adopt a distributed approach making it possible to divide the task
of keeping the records related to the living flows among multiple processes.
The proposed architecture is made of the following modules:
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1. Meter, which captures the packets from a network interface, or equiva-
lently from a trace file, associates them with a flow identification num-
ber, the so-called flow id, and passes them to the next component.
2. Flow Cache, which stores the metrics related to the living flows ob-
served and updates the records. This is the most challenging compo-
nent as it has to search and update the metrics within the inter arrival
time. For this reason we decided to introduce more flow caches and
implement each of them as a separate process. Flow records are as-
sociated to them on the basis of their flow id. The flow cache is also
responsible for exporting all the information related to timed-out flows
to a further component, i.e. the collector.
3. Collector, which collects the metrics related to the flows observed by
all the flow caches. The collected data can be used by classifier.
Furthermore, valuable capabilities, such as on-line packet sniffing and
filtering, packet analysis based on a trace file, customizable definition of a
flow via a scripting language, and customizable definition of a metric via an
API are provided.
The software is available on the SourceForge web-site1.
4.3.1 DiFMon Meter
The Meter performs the following tasks:
1. capturing packets from the network interface or from a trace file;
2. associating a flow id with every packet;
3. providing a time stamp in order to keep track of when the packet was
captured;
4. identifying, by means of the flow id, the flow cache which is related to
the flow;
1http://difmon.sourceforge.net
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5. sending the packet (together with its flow id and time stamp) to the
selected flow cache.
The flow id computation relies on a set of rules defined by the user by
means of a standard language. Such language supports the flow definition
according to the contents of the packet headers from the IP level to the
application level.
The selection of the flow cache is done by means of a hash function applied
to the flow id. The chosen function is the “mmh” which is fast enough and
has good stochastic properties that enable the uniform distribution of the
flow records among the various flow caches.
4.3.2 DiFMon Flow Cache
The flow cache keeps track of living flows in order for metrics to be updated
in real time. It receives the captured packet and the related flow id from
the meter and, then, establishes whether a corresponding flow record already
exists. If so, the flow cache updates the related metrics, otherwise a new flow
record is created.
Based on the assumption that the user should be able to define specific
metrics, an API is provided. This makes the system very flexible and capable
to support different kinds of classification processes.
Moreover, the flow cache periodically sends the data related to the no-
more-living flows to the collector. The definition of a living flow can be based
either on the introduction of a timeout or on the analysis of TCP sessions.
Since the classification process may require the exporting of some still-
living flows. In this case the flow cache selects living flows to be exported
through a heuristic function.
The main challenge is the development of a fast and effective flow cache.
In particular it is necessary to implement a suitable data structure together
with an ordering mechanism to maintain information about living flows. We
intend to apply an LRU (Least Recently Used) ordering as it is the main so-
lution used in caching algorithms. This ordering algorithm allows addressing
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two issues: it provides a fast way to detect timed out flows as well as a good
heuristic to select the so-called heavy hitters flows, where a heavy hitter flow
is a high rate flow.
In fact, by scanning the LRU queue from the tail and by checking for
each record whether the difference between the record’s last update time
and the current time exceeds the timeout, it is possible to find every timed-
out flow. Therefore, if the search for heavy hitters flows is always done by
scanning the LRU list from its head, one will step into heavy hitters flows
with high probability. The exporting process can take advantage of this
ordering mechanism simply exporting the first N records of the flow cache
queue.
4.3.3 DiFMon Collector
The collector is the module responsible for collecting the metrics of all the
observed flows and sending them to the running classifier. In case it receives
flow records related to the no-more-living flows from the flow caches, then
such records are both stored into a file and sent to the applications. In case
the collector receives living flows, it passes them directly to the classifier
performing real time operations. Like the flow cache, the collector provides
an API.
4.3.4 DiFMon Management Protocol
In this section we present the protocol for managing interactions among the
monitoring system components. The aim is to make the system robust,
flexible and tolerant to every kind of faults and errors. To this purpose,
when designing such a protocol we made the following assumptions:
1. the system modules run on hosts belonging to a dedicated network
separated from the network to be monitored. This is for two reasons:
first, the traffic generated by the monitoring system must not affect
the behavior of the monitored traffic. Second, the network connecting
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system components should be faster than the monitored network as it
has to re-transmit every captured packet plus some further information.
2. The modules may run on different machines as well as two or more
modules may run on a same machine.
3. The meter is fast enough to perform packet capturing and classification
within the mean packet inter arrival time. Both the meter and the
collector have to be properly designed and implemented since their
behavior largely affects system performance.
4. Both the meter and the collector use well defined port numbers to
send or receive signaling messages, while data transfers between system
modules happen by using port numbers dynamically chosen.
4.4 Pattern Recognition Techniques for Clas-
sifying of Threats
In this section we will deal with the problem of classifying users’ behavior
provided by the lower monitor module, and the technique to extract models
for improve the detection capability of possible threats.
In the framework proposed the classifier represent the core of the IDS.
This component analyzes the current data on users’ behavior and classifies
them. As stated in chapter 2 several are the techniques to detect malicious
activities. In our IDS framework we adopted a misuse detection approach
since it represents a good trade-off between signature-based solution and
anomaly detection in terms of false positives and true negatives.
Based on this approach, the classification process uses a set of rules ex-
tracted by means of pattern recognition algorithms in the off-line process
of our framework: such rules encode the misuse activities in the network.
The metrics’ pattern about the users’ behavior extracted by monitor are
compared against all the rules in the set; when the examined information
matches at least one rule, an intrusive action is detected.
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Clearly inferring classification criteria by means of pattern recognition
algorithms is one of the main issues for identifying dangerous activities in
traffic network. In particular the application of these methodologies to IDS
context concerns the definition of a proper data set, containing user profiles
on which the data mining processes work in order to extract the models.
In principle, an efficient set of rules for the detection has to contain all of
the possible user behaviors. Moreover, according to all pattern recognition
processes, the data set has to properly label the behavior profile items with
either “normal” or “attack”. Although this might look like an easy task,
labelling the data imposes a pre-classification process: you have to know
exactly which profile is “normal” and which is not.
In order to solve the issue related to data set building, two main ap-
proaches are possible: the former relies on simulating a real-world network
scenario, the latter builds the set using actual traffic.
The first approach is usually adopted when applying pattern recognition
techniques to intrusion detection. The most well-known dataset is the so-
called KDD Cup 1999 Data, which was created for the Third International
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, held within KDD-
99, The Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining2 that was created by the Lincoln Laboratory at MIT in order to
conduct a comparative evaluation of intrusion detection systems, developed
under DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency) and AFRL
(Air Force Research Laboratory) sponsorship3.
This set was created in order to evaluate the ability of data mining al-
gorithms to build predictive models able to distinguish between a normal
behavior and a malicious one. The KDD Cup 1999 Data contains a set of
“connection” records, our users’ behaviors, descending from those defined by
Stolfo, and coming out from the elaboration of raw TCPdump data. Each
connection is labelled as either “normal” or “attack”.
Although widely employed, some criticisms have been raised against the
2http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
3http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/ideval
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1999 KDD Cup Data [39]. Indeed, numerous research works analyze the
difficulties arising when trying to reproduce actual network traffic patterns
by means of simulation [40]. Actually, the major issue resides in effectively
reproducing the behavior of network traffic sources.
Another issue is related to the types of traffic contained in the 1998
DARPA IDEVAL data set. Today, the ever-changing paradigms of network-
ing applications have deeply modified network traffic profiles with respect
to 1998. Some researches demonstrate that new traffic types, for example
P2P traffic, are replacing the traditional traffic patterns with respect to the
data volume generated. Intrusion detection systems depend critically on the
accuracy of the traffic used to construct the network behavioral models by
means of data mining processes. For example, normal traffic can be misin-
terpreted as anomalous in case some traffic samples are not present in the
training data set.
Based on the considerations above, we can conclude that the KDD Cup
1999 Data can just be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the pattern recog-
nition algorithms under study, rather than in the real application of intrusion
detection.
Collecting real traffic can be considered as a viable alternative approach
for the construction of the traffic data set [41]. Although it can prove effective
in real-time intrusion detection, it still presents some concerns. In particular,
collecting the data set by means of real traffic needs a data pre-classification
process. In fact, as stated before the pattern recognition process needs a data
set in which packets are labelled as either “normal” or “attack”. Indeed, no
information is available in the real traffic to distinguish normal activities
from malicious ones in order to label the data set. So we have a paradox: we
need pre-classified traffic in order to extract the models able to classify the
traffic.
In our framework we adopted a real traffic collection approach for ex-
tracting the network behavior models. The data set has been built by col-
lecting real traffic on the local network at Genova National Research Council
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(CNR). The raw traffic data set contains about one million packets, equiva-
lent to 1GByte of data. The network traffic has been captured by means of
the TCPdump tool and logged to a file. Such data have been elaborate to
properly label them.
After defining the data set, the model extraction requires to manage such
data in order to realize the pattern recognition process. Every element in
the data set is usually a record of features, our metrics, about a specific user
behavior. Indeed, just few features can be used to tell apart normal from
anomalous traffic in the analyzed network scenario. In fact, some attacks
can be classified only with a small set of behavior features. This can be
considered as an advantage: we can reduce the dimensional space of the data
set, letting the pattern recognition process become simpler. Common to
all the data mining processes, the issue of feature subset selection is known
as feature selection problem. In our context, we have adopted ToolDiag4, a
pattern recognition toolbox, in order to carry out feature selection [12].
The last step in our work has concerned the extraction of network behav-
ior patterns from the data set. To this purpose, we have adopted the SLIP-
PER5 [42] tool. SLIPPER is a rule-learning system exploiting the Boosting
technique [43]. On the basis of Cohen’s RIPPER program, a widely adopted
learning system [13], the SLIPPER algorithm creates a rule set by iteratively
boosting a greedy rule-builder. At each iteration, the rule-builder generates
an individual rule, by splitting the training data into a growing set and a
pruning set ; a single rule gradually “grows” by using the first set. The rule it-
self is a sequence of conditions on the values of the features. Such conditions
are needed in order to correctly classify the items of the data set belonging
to the “positive class” (i.e. the class associated with attacks). A final default
condition classifies the complementary “negative class” (i.e. normal traffic).
The new rule generated overfits the training data; then, the final sequence
of conditions is pruned off from the rule, which is finally tested by using the
pruning set. If the rule shows a good accuracy, it is added to the rule set.
4http://www.inf.ufes.br/∼thomas/home/tooldiag.html
5http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/∼wcohen/slipper/
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Train Error Rate Test Error Rate Hypothesis Size Learning Time
0.20% 0.36% 10 Rules, 37 Conditions 217.33s
Table 4.1: Detection accuracy after feature selection – Average values
Training Set Test Set Missed Detections False Alarms
1st Half 2nd Half 33.59% 0.06%
2nd Half 1st Half 50.41% 0.03%
Table 4.2: Detection accuracy after filtering and feature selection
The SLIPPER algorithm uses boosting to reduce the weight of the data set
items covered by the new rule.
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section we will provide some results about the solution proposed.
We observe that the main contribution to the effectiveness of the framework
comes from the behaviors’ models for classification, since they influence the
capability of system to discriminate among normal activities and malicious
ones. Based on this consideration we will focus on the performance analysis
of data mining techniques, in particular on the missed detection rate and,
more important, on the false alarm rate, which is a critical requirement for
an effective intrusion detection system [44].
Though in other pattern recognition applications a false positive rate
below 5% may be a very satisfactory value, in intrusion detection such a rate
may not be acceptable. For example, if we imagine to work on a network
with a packet rate of 1000000 packets per hour, a false alarm rate of 0.1%
would lead to 1000 annoying alert messages sent to the administrator every
hour: though characterized by a very low false alarm rate, the number of
unjustified alerts would be too high and would lead the administrator to
ignore or eventually switch the intrusion detection system off.
We ran different tests on some previously collected data (see section 4.4).
First of all, we decided to subsample the data by a factor of 1/10 in order to
reduce the computation time of the results; as stated before, we use ToolDiag
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Training Set Test Set Missed Detections False Alarms
1st Half 2nd Half 13.57% 0.16%
2nd Half 1st Half 55.32% 0.07%
Table 4.3: Detection accuracy without feature selection
Training Set Test Set Missed Detections False Alarms
1st Half 2nd Half 13.79% 0.16%
2nd Half 1st Half 62.19% 0.05%
Table 4.4: Detection accuracy after filtering without feature selection
for the feature selection step and SLIPPER for the classification. In the first
experiment we subsample the data-set by choosing one behavior record out
of ten, then we split the subsets in two parts. On each of the half-subset
obtained we perform feature selection and, by examining the discriminating
power and the number of occurrences over the whole data set of the selected
features, we choose an “optimum” set of features. By “optimum” feature,
we mean a feature whose ability to discriminate between attacks and normal
traffic, within the training data, is the highest with respect to the discrim-
inating power of all the examined features. We consider then, in turn and
for each subset, the first half as the training set, and the second half as the
test set; then we swap training and test sets, using the second half of each
subset as the training set and the first half as the test set. All these exper-
iments are useful to understand which is the best data set we have, as we
suppose to have no prior knowledge about the discriminating power of the
connection records included in each one of them. In table 4.1 we point out
the average values emerging from the analysis of the presented results.
It is worth pointing out that the data we are working on contain some
records tagged as uncertain. These represent data for which it was impossible
to assign for certain neither “normal” nor “attack” class. In this first experi-
ment we decided to label the corresponding packet as normal. We performed
a second experiment discarding these uncertain packets. Thus we built and
processed a “filtered out” data set, made up by all the records corresponding
to packets whose classification was clear enough, obtained by deleting from
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Training Set Test Set Missed Detections False Alarms
1st Half 2nd Half 4% 0%
2nd Half 1st Half 0% 0%
Table 4.5: Detection accuracy without feature selection – Trin00 attack
Training Set Test Set Missed Detections False Alarms
1st Half 2nd Half 0% 0%
2nd Half 1st Half 0% 0%
Table 4.6: Detection accuracy after filtering and without feature selection – Trin00 attack
the set the uncertain connection records.
Again we proceeded with feature selection and obtained, in the same way
as before, the best set of features. On the filtered data we decided to deploy a
test by using the whole dataset, with no subsampling. We divided the dataset
in two halves and, in Test 1 we considered the first half as the training set,
and the second half as the test set; in Test 2, instead, we consider the second
half of the data set as the training set and the first half as the test set.
Furthermore, to test the effect of feature selection on the detection ca-
pability of the system, we decided not to apply subsampling, and to test
the classifier on the datasets before and after the filtering process described
above (tables 4.3, 4.4).
We notice a very low false alarm rate, which is good, and a missed detec-
tion rate sometimes around 60%. This might seem a not so good result, but
it is not; missing an attack packet does not mean to miss the whole attack
itself; in fact, an attack pattern may consist of a burst of packets thus, not
detecting a few of such packets doesn’t mean to lose the attack. Stressing
again the false alarm rate problem, we notice that the rate obtained within
our experiments is very low, and encouraging for the development of this
kind of detection techniques.
In order to strengthen these observations, we also sketch, in Table 4.5 the
detection capabilities tested over a particular DoS attack, Trin00, which is
always correctly detected by our IDS without rising any false alarm. This
confirms the applicability of the realized IDS within the proposed framework
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for intrusion detection and reaction.
Finally, as we have a little lower missed detection rate when not using
feature selection, we noticed an increase of one order of magnitude in rule
calculation time and number of rules. This is due to the fact that we have
to strike the balance between detection accuracy, number of adopted criteria
and computation time.
4.6 A Distributed Solution
The system described is a centralized solution: all of the components are
tightly coupled and are supposed to run on a single node. The higher and
higher bandwidth capacity of the current network infrastructure suggests to
study robust and flexible solutions that are able to support the great amount
of traffic to analyze.
By this assumption, in this last section we want to propose a possible
solution for improving flexibility and robustness of the system by appropri-
ately distributing the skills of a centralized solution to several independent
components across the network [45].
The solution proposed consists of several entities, whose orchestrated op-
eration concurs in ensuring that IDS works correctly (Figure 4.7).
• Preprocessor
Each such component is in charge of:
1. capturing raw data from the network;
2. extracting behavioral information from captured packets;
3. sending the computed information to a broker entity.
• Broker
The broker is a mediation component whose main tasks are:
1. collecting behavioral information coming from preprocessor;
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Figure 4.7: A model for a Distributed IDS
2. distributing the collected information to one or more detection
engines. The distribution strategy is defined by means of a policy-
based approach.
• Detection Engine
Detection engines receive behavioral information from the broker and
decide on whether or not such information represents a potential attack
pattern, based on a specific detection technique.
• Decision Engine
The main task of the decision engine resides in collecting information
coming from detection engines and coming up with a final decision con-
cerning the current network situation. This might be done through a
number of approaches, ranging from simple majority voting to much
more complex solutions in which the various inputs coming from the
detection engines are appropriately weighted on the basis of their de-
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gree of reliability (with respect to their own capability of detecting a
particular set of malicious activities).
Dynamic deployment of the distributed system components is actually
needed in order to ensure both flexibility of the architecture and robustness
in the face of changes in network and traffic conditions. As an example, the
IDS might need several detection engines, each exploiting the best fitting
detection technique according to the system status.
Chapter 5
A Distributed Cooperative
System for Network Security
As the computer attacks become more and more sophisticated, the need of
new approaches and solutions to provide effective detection and reaction in-
creases. In particular, one of the main challenges consists in appropriately
facing distributed attacks, that are becoming the most effective threats to
network security. Unfortunately, “isolated” security systems, as that pre-
sented in chapter 4, are bound to fail in identifying potential distributed
threats, since usually the locality principle, either spatial or temporal, can’t
be fruitfully exploited to detect this type of attacks.
To cope with such lack of locality, it is possible to implement an “al-
liance” between isolated systems in order to face coordinated and distributed
attacks. In a cooperative system for network security, each component ex-
changes, with its peer entities, information about the evidence of anomalous
behaviors. Hence intuitively, the reliability of the network security system
can be increased by adopting strategies for correlating the information pro-
vided by multiple sources. According to these assumptions, in the following
of this chapter we will present a new cooperative solution for DDoS detec-
tion, which is able to improve the capability of the overall system to enforce
the effectiveness of detection process.
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5.1 DCube: Distributed DDoS Detection
Let us consider a potential target of an attack, be it a single host or an overall
network. It is intuitive that it is easier to detect a suspicious activity close
to the target (the borderline case being the target itself who is in charge of
detecting the attack) rather than far away from it. This is particularly true in
the presence of a threat foreseeing the coordinated interaction of a number of
distributed nodes. In the depicted scenario, in fact, the closer to the victim,
the more information can be retrieved in order to effectively detect a potential
attack. On the other hand, detecting a threat far-off from the victim enables
a quicker identification of the attack source(s), thus allowing for a prompt
mitigation of the attack effects, as well as a reduced impact on the quality
of service perceived by legitimate users of the network. Furthermore, it has
been demonstrated in chapter 3 that solutions relying on the combination
of information coming from multiple sources clearly could outperform legacy
approaches based just on the elaboration of local data, which do not contain
any context-related information. Local analysis, even though capable to infer
information about the relations existing among a set of different traffic flows
as shown in chapter 4, is strictly linked to data traversing a specific area of
the network. Such an analysis is thus totally unaware of the global context,
which is by no doubt in some relation with locally monitored events. This is
the reason why we firmly believe that out-of-context information can prove
as successful as context-aware data only in close proximity to the victim.
Let us consider the scenario shown in figure 5.1, where a distributed
attack is depicted. Using a coordinated action the attackers quickly deny the
availability of the target service to legitimate users. We can define a direction
of the malicious activity from the attackers to the target. The “disruptive”
power grows while the attack’s flows direct towards the victim, thanks to
their aggregation effects. The main idea of our approach is to prevent the
catastrophic damage by means of a cooperative action of the nodes involved
somehow in the attack process: each node supplies to other nodes its “talent”
to detect an attack. The exchanged information flows in the same direction
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Figure 5.1: A typical distributed attack
as the attack, i.e. from the attackers to the target.
Each node will in some way use information sent by other nodes in order
to improve its own detection capability. Once done with a decision about
potentially harmful flows, it will in turn make such information available to
the others (e.g. the downstream nodes along the path of the suspicious flow).
This process perfectly fits the previous assumption about the improvement of
the detection capability near the victim, thanks to broader information avail-
ability. Furthermore, thanks to this technique it is possible to adopt reactive
policies (e.g. dropping of packets belonging to harmful flows, application of
traceback techniques, etc.) faraway from the victim. The information about
the ongoing attack keeps on growing as long as we move from the attackers
towards the target.
Keeping in mind the above considerations, we proposed a distributed
context-aware solution to issue of identifying distributed security threats. It
has been called DCube (or D3), standing for Distributed DDoS Detection. A
possible deployment of system is depicted in Figure 5.2
The system consists of several components (DCube nodes) spread across
the network, which are entitled to express their opinion about a specific
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Figure 5.2: A DCube Deployment
situation. As an example, these nodes might be intrusion detection systems
used to detect potential attacks to a network infrastructure; every node might
implement a specific algorithm or techniques in order to identify security
threats independently from the other nodes. At the occurrence of specific
events (e.g. a new packet is captured, a timeout for exporting flow information
expires, etc.) each DCube node will emit its own verdict depending on the
inner behavioral rules it is based upon. Then, the verdict is sent to neighbor
by a communication protocol for implementing the collaborative detection.
As already mentioned in chapter 3, several are the requirements for a
cooperative solution.
In the following subsections we will describe the solutions proposed for
meeting the issues mentioned above.
5.1.1 DCube Information Exchange Protocol
This section deals with the critical challenge of defining an effective protocol
to exchange information among the network nodes. This protocol has the
main task to support the system by providing it with the “relationships”
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needed to make the system itself cooperative. Furthermore, in a collaborative
and coordinated scenario, each node makes a decision taking into account the
“context” of the network; this context, also known as “network status”, is
provided by the information exchange protocol. Like in a human community,
the “news” spreads node by node so that a growing number of nodes gradually
learns the network context. All node behaviors are thus influenced by the
“opinion” of the entire node community.
The main task of this protocol is to let information spread through the
node community. Whenever the network context changes new information
must be sent to update the community members. This scattering process can
be obtained in different ways. Borrowing from sensor network approaches [46,
47, 48], we adopt a hop by hop solution, whereby a node sends information
to all its neighbors except the node which the “news” has come from.
Two different actions can be undertaken whenever a news arrives, based
on whether or not the node is on the attack path. If the node is on the path, it
reinforces or weakens the news based on its local “experience”, and sends the
new information to other nodes except the previous one on path. Otherwise,
the node just forwards the information without its local contribution if it is
not on the path. This solution is complied with need to assure the spatial
proximity of the data exchanged. The neighbor nodes, especially these on the
path, are interested in local experiences much more that the faraway ones.
Anyway, the protocol achieves a wider information spreading by sending
data also to nodes not directly involved in the attack; in such way the “lo-
cal” attack evidence can reach nodes involved in the same distributed and
coordinated attack action, thus reinforcing their detection capability.
In order to reduce the overhead due to dissemination protocol the infor-
mation exchanged must marginally weigh on current network load. For this
reason we assure the data exchanging only during an attack ongoing, and
design a data format which restrict the information to the essential one.
Keeping in mind these assumptions, for each critical flow we define:
CFID - Critical Flow ID: the ID of the critical flow, for example the 5-
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CFID MTR CONF LOC AGE
Figure 5.3: DCube Packet
tuple (SRC IP, DST IP, SRC PORT, DST PORT, PROTOCOL) or
any of its subsets.
MTR - Metric: a metric or a feature detecting an anomalous behavior of
the flow.
CONF - Confidence: a single value or a vector of values representing the
estimated reliability of the detection result for the critical flow related
to the metric (e.g. I’m telling you that I detected a potential attack
with 99% reliability).
LOC - Location: a flag that indicates whether or not the incoming infor-
mation arrives from the same path of the critical flow or from a different
path.
AGE - Ageing: a parameter indicating the distance in hops from the first
node which has detected an anomaly in a monitored flow.
So, we define DCube Packet – D3P – the vector:
D3P = (CFID;MTR;CONF ;LOC;AGE) (5.1)
Each node exchanges D3Ps with its neighbors (by means of the protocol
described in the previous subsection) every time a new anomaly related to
a flow is observed, or a D3P is received from a neighboring node and a new
CONF value is computed. This process is sketched in Figure 5.4.
In Figure 5.5 we draw the data flow diagrams for detection process car-
ried out at a generic node. Every node analyzes a set of flows and for each
flow in the set measures information according to the associated metrics. In
case the monitoring activity raises an alarm for a certain metric concerning
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a specific flow, the node in question creates a new D3P packet and immedi-
ately thereafter starts the information spreading process by sending it to its
neighbors. Moreover, if a new D3P packet arrives at the node carrying in-
formation about a flow which is not deemed to be critical on the basis of the
local analysis, the node nonetheless merges its local information about such
flow with the global information contained in the incoming D3P and then
creates an updated D3P which is sent to its neighbors.
5.1.2 DCube Information Fusion
The main issues related to algorithm depicted in Figure 5.5 are the MTR
Analysis and the Information Fusion process. This chapter deals mainly
with the latter point. The former one, indeed, is related to the problem of
local detection of malicious activities discussed in chapter 4: the IDS solution
proposed previously can be exploited for assuring an effective detection.
The information fusion is a critical task for our system. It concerns the
techniques for merging at node “local” knowledge about a critical flow with
the “global” information about the same flow incoming from the other nodes.
As stated in chapter 3 a common problem in distributed collaborative
system is how to combine the decisions coming from different modules with
the final aim of improving both the accuracy of the classification process and
the reliability of the decision-making process [49].
Several techniques have been proposed for combining data from multiple
information sources. The simplest fusion mechanism is majority voting [50].
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Such a method is very simple, and prone to errors or information injection
attacks. A weighted majority might solve the problem of assigning a fair share
of trustworthiness to each component of the whole system, though it does
not express correctly the mutual relationships among detection sensors due to
their relative position in the network, as well as their past interactions. This
leaves the system exposed to failures due to misbehaving detection nodes.
The bayesian fusion method is, instead, the best-known one [51]; accord-
ing with the Bayes formula, we can compute the conditional probability of an
event Ei given the a priori probability of the event itself, and the conditional
joint probability of the evidences on Ei from different sources:
P (Ei | S1, ..., Sn) = P (S1, ..., Sn | Ei)P (Ei)∑
j P (S1, ..., Sn | Ej)P (Ej)
(5.2)
By correctly assigning the values of both a priori and conditional proba-
bility, it is possible to express the relative trustworthiness of each detection
module. Still, no mechanism is used to cope with reciprocal trustworthi-
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ness. Obviously, in order to use the bayesian fusion method, we need to
be able to exactly characterize the possible events probabilitywise. This is,
unfortunately, unpractical in most cases.
The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, on the other hand, provides an inter-
esting alternative to traditional bayesian models for the mathematical rep-
resentation of uncertainty [52, 53, 54]. The basic principle which this theory
is based upon consists of the fact that no a priori probability is needed for
the events at hand. Indeed, the D-S theory aims at characterizing the degree
of belief in the occurrence of an event based on the observation of a num-
ber of witnesses. In our case, the event set contains both the occurrence of
a malicious behavior and a normal behavior; the sensors, instead, represent
the witnesses reporting the occurrence of the monitored events. From this
perspective, such a theory can be interpreted as a generalization of the clas-
sical probability theory, where probabilities are assigned to sets or intervals
rather than to mutually exclusive singletons.
Moreover, the most innovative and interesting aspect of the D-S theory is
the criterion which allows to combine evidence coming from multiple sources
and to model conflicts among them. In fact, such criterion was calculated
once and for all when such theory first came out, and is applicable regardless
of the probabilistic characterization of both the monitored events and the
detectors. It is worth discussing some of the formal details involved in D-S
theory in order to make things clear.
Given a set of events X, we will consider its power set P (X), and a
generic set A such as A ∈ P (X). Three fundamental functions are used in the
framework of D-S theory, in order to express in a rigorous way the concepts
of belief and reliability discussed so far: the basic probability assignment
function (bpa), the Belief function, and the Plausibility function.
The basic probability assignment is a primitive of the evidence theory,
and defines a mapping of the power set to the interval between 0 and 1.
m : P (X)→ [0, 1] (5.3)
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More exactly, the value m(A) of the bpa for a given set A expresses the
proportion of all relevant and available evidence that supports the claim that
a particular element of the considered global set belongs to the set A but to
no particular subset of A.
Formally, this description of bpa can be represented with the following
equations:
m(∅) = 0 (5.4)
∑
A∈P (X)
m(A) = 1 (5.5)
By means of equations 5.4 and 5.5, the upper and lower bounds of an
interval can be defined. Such interval contains the probability of a subset of
X, or an element of P (X), and is bounded by two nonadditive continuous
values called, respectively, Belief and Plausibility.
The lower bound, Belief, for a set A is defined as the sum of all the basic
probability assignments of the proper subsets B of the set of interest A, such
as B ⊆ A.
The upper bound, Plausibility, is the sum of all the basic probability
assignments of the sets B that intersect the set of interest A, such as B∩A 6=
∅.
Formally, for all sets A that are elements of the power set, A ∈ P (X),
Belief(A) =
∑
B|B⊆A
m(B) (5.6)
Plausibility(A) =
∑
B|B∩A 6=∅
m(B) (5.7)
The D-S theory provides a rule to combine evidences from independent
observers. To make things simple, let’s assume two of them: O1 and O2. The
combined bpa is expressed by:
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m12(A) =
∑
B∩C=Am1(B)m2(C)∑
B∩C 6=∅m1(B)m2(C)
(5.8)
The depicted D-S combination rule implies that we equally weight all the
observers. This assumption normally does not hold in real environments. In
our case, with an overlay infrastructure for security, sensors span multiple
domains [53]. Hence, we need to take into account different levels of reliabil-
ity. First, information coming from different remote sources is considered less
reliable than the one produced by local sources. Second, multiple sources are
located in different places; hence, they may capture different traffic profiles.
An extended D-S combination rule has been proposed, which considers a
“conditioned” view of evidence and proposes a modified combining rule able
to take into account the above mentioned weights [53]. This new solution
properly addresses the fact that we cannot trust all the sensors equally, and
that given observers might have different effectiveness in detecting individual
misuse types. The proposed combining rule is:
m12(A) =
∑
B∩C=A[m1(B)]w1 [m2(C)]w2∑
B∩C 6=∅[m1(B)]w1 [m2(C)]w2
(5.9)
It can prove useful to adopt a weight for each evidence based on para-
meters like the neighbors’ historical performance figures. So we consider the
D-S combining rule expressed in 5.9, where the weight wi for the i-th evi-
dence is a function of location parameter LOC, and the ageing parameter
AGE :
wi = f(LOC,AGE) (5.10)
In the following we will focus on the these two parameters, which both
deal with issues related to a potential attack scenario and that must be con-
sidered to make the system more robust by improving its capability to react
to threats as soon and as effectively as possible. We base our discussion on
the following fundamental observations related to the detection mechanism:
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• the farther the distance from the target, the less the information avail-
able to the detection process. Hence, as detection capabilities improve
gradually from the attacker to the target, a CONF value too high in a
node far-off from the target might compromise the detection by bias-
ing it around a bad decision. A mechanism for appropriately weighing
the CONF value based on the distance from the target is needed.
• It is important to make a distinction between critical flow information
coming directly from a node belonging to the attack path and informa-
tion received from nodes outside the path.
As an example of the application of the above considerations, let us illus-
trate a potential information fusion algorithm. Let us consider the following
hypothesis. The possible values for wi range from 0 to 1; in particular, wi is
equal to 0 when AGE is equal to 1, and LOC is equal to 0. Contrariwise,
wi is equal to 1 when AGE is greater then a certain threshold T, and LOC
is equal to 1.
So if we consider:
wAGE =

0 if AGE = 1,
f(AGE) if 1 < AGE < T,
1 if AGE > T.
(5.11)
then we can adopt the following formula:
wi =
LOC + wAGE
2
(5.12)
Anyway, it is also possible to assign a different meaning to the two para-
meters above. For example, we might consider that LOC is more important
than the AGE: in this case equation 5.12 becomes:
wi =
clLOC + cawAGE
2
(5.13)
with
cl = 0.6, ca = 0.4 (5.14)
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Figure 5.6: Information fusion scheme
According to the assumptions above, we propose an algorithm for aggre-
gation of evidence information (Figure 5.6).
A top-down view of the picture, shows how a new confidence value can
always be computed by appropriately combining both local and global con-
fidence information. As to the global contribution, the figure highlights that
foreign confidence data can come from nodes which happen to be either on-
or off-path with respect to the specific attack pattern. As already mentioned,
on-path nodes might have a stronger impact on the computation of global
confidence than off-path nodes which can often be supposed to have been
looking at attack data from a narrower perspective. Finally, local confidence
might be influenced by both information extrapolated from local traffic analy-
sis and beforehand information about the actual effectiveness of the locally
employed detection algorithm(s).
From an implementation point of view we can consider MTR analysis is
performed by an IDS, for example the system presented in chapter 4. We as-
sume that each IDS classifies network traffic by associating each packet with a
specific “class”. For the sake of simplicity, we herein make the hypothesis that
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the classes involved are the following: attack and normal. Hence, the power
set involved in our discussion is P (X) = {{attack}, {normal}, {attack/normal}}.
This means that upon reception of a packet, each DCube node classifies it
depending on its own bpa, which is seen as a vector of three possible values,
associated, respectively, with the probability that the packet in question is
either an attack, or a normal piece of information, or something which the
IDS is not able to classify as belonging to either of the above classes.
The output of the different nodes is then normalized in order to have a
uniform view of the various responses. By adopting a model proposed by
Gargiulo et al. [55], the normalization process is performed by computing an
appropriate indicator, X, which in our case is expressed by:
X =
m(attack)−m(normal)
1− (m(attack/normal)) (5.15)
As explained above, the value m(A) of the bpa for a given set A and a
given detection module expresses the fraction of all relevant and available
evidence supporting the claim that a particular observed event belongs to
the set A and to no particular subset of A.
The above indicator has been conceived in such a way as to guarantee
that the following properties are always respected:
• the sign of the function must depend just on the numerator;
• the variability range of the indicator must be [−1,+1]. The closer to
1, the more likely the classified packet belongs to an attack session;
similarly, the closer to −1, the more likely the packet contains normal
data.
• The value of the denominator has no influence on the sign of the indica-
tor. Though, the higher the value assigned to the composite hypothesis
(i.e. attack/normal), the farther the indicator will be from both −1 and
+1 limit values.
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We remark that such indicator proves useful only in case we consider two
alternative classification clusters (like the classes attack and normal in our
example, plus the third class attack/normal which is just used to deal with
uncertainty). In case more classes were present, a different indicator should
be considered.
Given the above formulation, we can try to balance between the number
of rejected packets (i.e. those packets for which we are unable to issue a
verdict) and the misclassification rate, by introducing an ad hoc threshold
value τ (Figure 5.7). The classification process will be performed as follows:
• Attacks: all packets for which X > τ ;
• Normal: all packets for which X < −τ ;
• Rejected: all packets for which −τ ≤ X ≤ τ .
Once a peer receives attack evidence from an DCube neighbor it applies
the Dempster-Shafer’s weighted combining rule reported in equation 5.9, us-
ing the weights wi in order to obtain a verdict that takes into account both
local observations and the observation of the neighbor. The response comes
in the form of an indicator representing the new CONF value, which is sent
to the neighbors in D3P packet.
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5.2 REFACING: A Reputation Model
Although this approach based on weighted D-S combining rule 5.12 is more
general than the basic one and can be applied to several kinds of attack sce-
narios, it still leaves an important open issue. This is mainly due to the fact
that information fusion approaches are mostly focused on the development of
effective analytic methods to evaluate combined evidence. However, we have
to take into account the actual deployment of sensors exploiting these ap-
proaches in real-world scenarios, in which the inherent dynamism forces both
evidences and weights to change in order to adapt combining rule’s results
to the situational-context.
Our work mainly deals with the practical application of the mentioned
theoretical results to the effective management of components for network se-
curity. One major issue concerns the procedure for adjusting the weights that
have to be adopted while evaluating the enhanced D-S combining rule, and
it can be addressed by equipping a system with self-management functional-
ity. We claim that in the above mentioned scenarios (and especially in those
related to network security) a broader vision should be considered in order
to make the deployment of the information fusion process more concrete. To
this aim, in this section we propose an improvement of the D-S formulation
by introducing a reputation model for a self-management approach to net-
work protection. We will propose an interpretation of Information Fusion as
a situational-aware and automatically adaptive decision-making process.
Several solutions have been proposed for estimating the reputation in a
cooperative system [56, 57, 58].
There are essentially three approaches to reputation estimation. The
first relies on a completely centralized solution, where an authority assigns
a trustworthiness value to each element; the components interact by using
such reputation labels. In the second approach, the trustworthiness value
of a component is estimated by collecting all the opinions about it coming
from the other elements of the community; usually, a centralized system is
responsible for collecting information and publishing the reputation values.
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A completely distributed solution for reputation characterizes the third ap-
proach: each element “locally” builds the opinions about other components,
just based on its direct and indirect interactions with them. Although the
third solution is more similar to the concept of “social network”, we claim
that, at present, a centralized entity holding a global reputation value for
each component better fits the security requirement of networks. “Local”
solutions, based on the direct interaction among the nodes, could be vul-
nerable to violations coming from deliberately misbehaving nodes. Some
compromised components could, in fact, spread false information, in order
to reduce the effectiveness of the detection. Anyway, a completely distrib-
uted solution, with some innovative approach to cope with false information
spreading is currently the subject of our work. According to the second ap-
proach, we propose a multi-layered model for estimating the reputation of
network components taking part to the distributed detection process, called
REFACING (RElationship-FAmiliarity-Confidence-INteGrity). The lower-
most layer provides information about the existence of some form of interac-
tion among “community” components. The absence of connection indicates
the actual impossibility of carrying out any form of social relationship with
the other nodes of the network. Otherwise, the second layer in the stack can
prove useful to quantitatively measure the level of interaction existing be-
tween each pair of network nodes. The more we interact, the more familiar
we are with each other. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that we trust each
other: I can know you quite well, but (or even better, just because of this) I
can hardly trust you, if our past interactions showed me that you are not that
reliable. This is the reason why we introduce the third layer of the trustwor-
thiness stack, which deals with confidence. If I have relations with others,
and if I am familiar with the others as well, I can much more objectively de-
termine their level of trustworthiness with respect to our social interactions.
This said, to further foster the capability of assessing someone else’s loyalty
level related to his/her interactions within the network, one more dimension
should be taken into account to somehow reflect the variability in the behav-
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ioral interaction patterns of each node. To make things clearer, the fact that
some node has showed a blameless behavior in one single interaction does
not necessarily mean that such node shall be irreproachable also in its subse-
quent interactions. Some form of estimation of the line of conduct over time
is definitely needed for all nodes: the more coherent my behavior has been in
the past, the less probable it will be that I will behave too differently in the
near future. This issue is dealt with at the uppermost layer, which provides
information about the level of integrity of network nodes. We do believe that
the adoption of such a multi-layered model helps add objectivity to the as-
sessment of network nodes’ reputation, since it takes into account a number
of complementary, though highly correlated, facets. The reputation system
has a global view of the physical topology of the network, and is thus capa-
ble to determine whether or not there exists some form of relationship (layer
1 in the trustworthiness stack) between the networks node, by interacting
with them. Furthermore, by exploiting monitoring, it can also determine
the frequency of the interactions among them (layer 2 of the stack). Infor-
mation pertaining to the third layer can be retrieved through a comparison
between each evaluation provided by any single node and the global opinion
of the system (e.g. my confidence level gets higher if my personal evaluation
was found in accordance with the final decision taken by the distributed de-
tection system, after analyzing all single decisions coming form the security
nodes). Finally, data at the fourth layer can be computed by statistically an-
alyzing the information related to all past interactions among all underlying
nodes (e.g. my integrity level gets higher if my confidence level has kept on
growing over the past interactions). After each evaluation turn, the manage-
ment layer can compute a set of labels (one for each network node involved
in the detection process), which are assigned to the nodes through, for ex-
ample, a policy-based approach. The label computation process can be as
general as possible, and will normally be influenced by information belong-
ing to all of the layers in the trustworthiness stack (in a simplistic scenario,
it might for example be a simple weighted sum of the values computed at
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each of the four layers). The labels are then used by all nodes whenever
they start a new interaction. Each label acts like a business card for the
node involved in the interaction and can be used by the other nodes, in or-
der to assign a weight to the information that each of them receives from its
partners. In order to better highlight the potential application of this novel
self-management approach to improve the information fusion process, let us
consider the weighted D-S combining rule expressed in (5.9). In this formula,
wi is the weight for the generic observer Oi. As claimed above, depending
on the situational-context, the management process can evaluate the level
of trustworthiness of each node involved in a generic transaction, by quan-
titatively measuring the relationship, familiarity, confidence and integrity
metrics.
During each transaction, each node has to evaluate the ith weight to be
employed in the D-S combining rule. To this aim it will apply a utility func-
tion, which we call management function (MF), to the previously measured
values as expressed below:
TRUST i =MF (Rel, Fam,Conf, Int) (5.16)
For administrative purposes the management function can be appropri-
ately suited to meet the specific domain’s high-level goals and/or require-
ments.
The weight wi in weighted D-S combining 5.9 becomes:
wi =
LOC + wAGE + TRUST i
3
(5.17)
or:
wi =
clLOC + cawAGE + crTRUST i
3
(5.18)
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5.2.1 REFACING and the Byzantine Generals Prob-
lem
First to focus on the implementation issues related to REFACING model, in
this subsection we comment on the possibility that some of the peering enti-
ties in the DCube community act as liars, like in the well-known Byzantine
Generals Problem [59]. It looks clear that in any networked environment
whose correct operation is based on the exchanging of information among
the various network entities, the hypothesis that none of these entities is a
liar must necessarily hold. This is true also in the case of DCube. In fact,
as already explained, our architecture envisages that each peer sends to its
neighboring entities a D3P each and every time something worth noting hap-
pens. The REFACING model provides the current trustworthiness value that
the node has been assigned. The TRUST parameter actually represents the
value of the trustworthiness label that has been computed by the system in
the latest update cycle. Nothing prevents a node from lying, by treacher-
ously inserting in the exchanged D3Ps modified values. The risks by this
issue are worked around by leaving the management layer to explicitly com-
municate to each peer the values of the labels of all of its neighbors. In this
way, at least for what concerns the TRUST parameter, the system becomes
capable to self-protect against the mentioned issue. It is understood that this
approach only solves the problem of ensuring correct information exchang-
ing with respect to sensitive information about critical flows and associated
metrics, which might in any case keep on lying on other aspects linked to the
communication between peer and the overlay management system.
5.3 REFACING Reputation System
In this section we present our proposal for “trustworthiness” estimation by
means of the REFACING model. The informal flow diagram in Figure 5.8
depicts the behavior of the system we realized.
In our view, the solution is implemented as an overlay layer which man-
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Figure 5.8: REFACING System Data Flow
ages the overall DCube infrastructure (Figure 5.9).
In order to allow the REFACING system to perform the estimation of the
weights, each DCube node computes the distance ∆ between the value Xlocal
of its own indicator before the fusion process and the value Xglobal received
by the neighbor, as mentioned in the section 5.1.2:
∆Fusion = |Xlocal −Xglobal| (5.19)
The value of ∆Fusion sent to the REFACING system can be considered
as a measure of the level of disagreement between the node’s verdict and the
verdict provided by the neighbors in the previous steps.
It is possible to determine whether or not a peer’s response was in accor-
dance with the global response by first analyzing the product (Xlocal ·Xglobal)
between the node’s indicator and the global one. If such product is negative,
there is disagreement in the responses; on the other hand, a positive result
means that the specific node and its neighbor have converged on a common
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decision.
The value of ∆Fusion helps quantify the level of agreement/disagreement
between the two entities and it is used in the REFACING management func-
tion to update the node’s reputation weight, as it will be thoroughly explained
in the following of this section. For the example above, we have derived the
following management function, used to perform the weight updating process.
Let us define:
• TRUSTi: the value of the trust of a generic node at the i-th iteration;
• RDi: the degree of correlation of the node at the i-th iteration;
• Ai: the mean value of the node’s trust at the i-th iteration;
• Vi: the variance of the node’s trust at the i-th iteration;
• SRi: the number of transactions during which the node has actively
contributed (i.e. it has issued his own verdict) to the distributed detec-
tion process, at the i-th iteration;
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• NR: the total number of transactions.
First, we compute the instantaneous value of the trust at the i-th trans-
action, based on the values it assumed in the past:
TRUSTi = Ai−1 +∆ (5.20)
where ∆ is computed as follows:
∆ =
{
Γ ∗ 1−Ai−1
2
∗ (1− ∆Fusion
2
), Agreement,
−Γ ∗ Ai−1
2
∗ (∆Fusion
2
), Disagreement.
(5.21)
In equation 5.21, the term Γ is computed as follows:
Γ = α ∗ Ai−1 + β ∗RDi−1 + χ ∗ Vi−1 (5.22)
with:
α + β + χ = 1 (5.23)
In our case, the parameters above have been set by trial and error and
have the following values:
α = 0.6, β = 0.3, χ = 0.1.
At this point, we can update the old values, which will be used to compute
the instantaneous weight at the occurrence of the next transaction:
RDi = 1− NR− SRi
NR
(5.24)
Ai =
SRi−1 ∗ Ai−1 + TRUSTi
SRi
(5.25)
Vi =
SRi−1 ∗ Vi−1 + (TRUSTi − Ai−1)2
SRi
(5.26)
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5.4 Experimental Results
In this section we present a performance evaluation of our solution. We show
the improvement achieved by our system with regards to previous solutions.
The analysis is conducted through an extensive simulation-driven cam-
paign. We developed a simulator, called RefacingSimulator 1, allowing us to
test the performance of the solution adopted in a number of different scenar-
ios. In the following subsection we first briefly provide a description of the
simulator, then we describe some interesting experimental results.
The RefacingSimulator is a software tool implemented in Java following
the classical Object Oriented design patterns. We implemented a number of
sensor categories, which have been used for our experimental measurements.
These categories are briefly described in the following:
• Reliable Sensor the ideal class of sensors; it provides a response which
is always in accordance with the event generated by the Attacker ;
• Lying Sensor the worst conceivable sensor; it always disagrees with the
event generated by the attacker, thus providing an error detection rate
of 100%;
• Shy Sensor not always participates in the detection process. Though,
in case of participation, it provides a response which is always in ac-
cordance with the event generated by the Attacker ;
• Variable Sensor decides randomly, based on a configurable probability
value, whether or not to provide a response which is in accordance with
the event generated by the Attacker ;
• Shy Variable Sensor implements a sensor showing a hybrid behavior,
influenced by both the shy and the variable paradigms. More precisely,
it does not always participate in the detection process, but in case of
involvement it randomly decides whether o not to provide a response
which is in accordance with the event generated by the Attacker ;
1http://refacing.sourceforge.net
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Scenario 1 (1000 Transactions, Attack Probability = 0.5)
Sensors Detection Errors
10 Reliable Sensors 0
10 Variable Sensors (Pe=0.3) 250
Majority Voting 0
D-S / No REFACING 6
D-S + REFACING 0
Table 5.1: Scenario 1
Scenario 2 (1000 Transactions, Attack Probability = 0.5)
Sensors Detection Errors
10 Reliable Sensors 0
10 Variable Sensors (Pe=0.7) 702
Majority Voting 0 (1 rejection)
D-S / No REFACING 29
D-S + REFACING 0
Table 5.2: Scenario 2
• Bursty Lying Sensor represents a liar, as in the case of the simple
lying sensor, with the difference that the lies it tells are concentrated
in bursts whose duration can be a priori configured.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution, we per-
formed some simulations in different scenarios. For all the scenarios we are
going to describe, we performed 1000 transactions, by choosing an event
generator characterized by an attack generation probability of 0.5 (i.e. one
out of two generated events represents, on average, an attack). For the
sake of simplicity, the following bpa function has been adopted for all peers:
bpa(Normal) = (0.896, 0.0, 0.103) and bpa(Attack) = (0.0, 0.896, 0.103). Such
a value for the bpa indicates a sensor which is quite good at detecting both
the attack and the normal class, characterized by a low, though non zero,
level of uncertainty. For the sake of completeness, it’s worth pointin out that
the issue of sensor characterization in the practice is beyond the scope of
this paper. The number of detection errors is calculated by summing up the
number of false negatives and the number of false positives. The number of
rejections, indicated in parentheses for majority voting, is not included as
part of the errors, hence it is reported separately.
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Scenario 3 (1000 Transactions, Attack Probability = 0.5)
Sensors Detection Errors
2 Reliable Sensors 103
12 Variable Sensors (Pe=0.3) 336
5 Lying Sensors 897
10 Bursty Variable Sensors 134
Majority Voting 153 (57 rejections)
D-S / No REFACING 520
D-S + REFACING 103
Table 5.3: Scenario 3
Scenario 4 (1000 Transactions, Attack Probability = 0.5)
Sensors Detection Errors
10 Variable Sensors (Pe=0.5) 378
Majority Voting 312 (134 rejections)
D-S / No REFACING 480
D-S + REFACING 508
Table 5.4: Scenario 4
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Figure 5.10: Scenario 1: Instantaneous Weight
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Figure 5.11: Scenario 1: Average Weight
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5.4.1 Scenario 1
Scenario 1 presents a configuration, composed of a total number of 20 REFAC-
ING peers, with 10 reliable sensors and 10 variable sensors, with a detection
error probability of 0.3 (Table 5.1).
From the simulation results we firstly observed that the variable peers
present an average number of detection errors equal to 25% of the total
number of transactions. This is in accordance with the detection error prob-
ability they had been assigned. By applying the basic D-S formula (i.e. in the
absence of REFACING), we observed, on average, a reduction in the num-
ber of detection errors equal to 97%. On the other hand, by applying the
weighted D-S formula with the REFACING approach we observed a further
decrease in the number of detection errors, which are in this case completely
eliminated.
Compared with the majority voting, our approach does not provide any
improvement. This can be justified by observing that the number of variable
nodes is exactly the same as the number of reliable ones. For this reason
the majority of nodes expressing the same decision always includes the set of
reliable nodes, together with a few variable ones and, therefore, the detection
errors are zero.
From a more detailed analysis of the graphs we can also draw that the
instantaneous value (and thus the average value) of the weight assigned to
reliable sensors keeps on growing during the simulation. This means that the
decisions taken by reliable peers become more and more important (i.e. they
have more and more influence on the final verdict) as long as the system
evolves. This result is justified by observing the average behavior of such
peers, which present the maximum degree of correlation (equal to 1 all along
the simulation), a very small variance, and a very high average weight.
On the other hand, variable peers show an ever-decreasing trend with
respect to the values of their weights (which are also rather low). This is
due to the fact that their detections suffer from both errors and discontinu-
ities. Weight decreases in case of detection errors are practically the same
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(in module) as weight increases in case of correct detection. This is justified
by the “constant” behavior of all peers in terms of both average values and
variance of their weights. Finally, weight reductions obtained for variable
sensors during the first transactions are due to the fact that the detection er-
rors produced by such peers are highly biased around the first few simulation
transactions.
5.4.2 Scenario 2
Scenario 2 presents the same configuration of scenario 1, except for detection
error probability of 0.7 for variable sensors (Table 5.2). Compared to the
results from the scenario 1 we can draw almost the same considerations.
Though, differently than before, we can now observe a greater decrease in
the value of the weight assigned to variable sensors. This is clearly justified
by the higher degree of uncertainty associated with detection errors. More
precisely, instantaneous weight values (and hence average weight values), are
much lower than in the previous case. This entails a reduced impact of
unreliable peers, and definitely improves the system’s detection capability
(thanks to the decrease in the number of detection errors). In this case, the
REFACING approach presents almost the same results when compared to
majority voting. In this scenario, since the error probability of the variable
sensors is higher, variable sensors might be simultaneously in accordance
between each other and, at the same time, in disagreement with the reliable
nodes.
5.4.3 Scenario 3
In scenario 3 we tried to draw a more realistic environment composed of
20 REFACING peers, with 2 reliable, 12 variable with a detection error
probability of 0.3, 5 lying peers, and finally 10 bursty variable peers with a
detection error probability of 0.3 and a burst of 50 detection errors all in the
first transactions (Table 5.3).
We observed that reliable peers present a false negative rate equal to
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Figure 5.13: Scenario 2: Instantaneous Weight
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Figure 5.14: Scenario 2: Average Weight
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Figure 5.15: Scenario 2: Variance Weight
10, 3% and 33, 6% of the total transactions respectively for reliable peers and
variable ones. The latter figures are in accordance with the detection error
probability assigned to the peers. Lying and bursty peers, instead, present
an average number of detection errors equal to 89, 7% 13, 4% and of the total
number of transactions. Furthermore, by applying the weighted D-S formula
(with the REFACING approach) we observed a very sensitive decrease in
the number of misdetections: the number of detection errors is, in fact, 75%
less than in the case the basic D-S formula is adopted. This means that the
application of the REFACING model to the weighted combination procedure
allows for an optimization of the overall system’s behavior: the number of
detection errors (after the information fusion process) for this scenario is
equal to the error detection rate of the involved reliable peers.
In order to further confirm the validity of our method, a comparison with
the majority voting approach has also been carried out. More precisely, an
improvement of 10, 7% in terms of the average detection error rate has been
achieved. By analyzing the graphs from simulations, we can also draw that
the instantaneous value (and thus the average value) of the weight assigned
to reliable sensors keeps on growing during the simulations. This means
that the decisions taken by reliable peers become more and more important
(i.e. they have more and more influence on the final verdict) as long as the
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Figure 5.16: Scenario 3: Instantaneous Weight
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Figure 5.17: Scenario 3: Average Weight
system evolves.
This result is justified by observing the average behavior of such peers,
which present the maximum degree of correlation (equal to 1 all along the
simulation), a very small variance, and a very high average weight. On the
other hand, variable peers show an ever-decreasing trend with respect to the
values of their weights (which are also rather low). This is due to the fact that
their detections suffer from both errors and discontinuities. Weight decreases
in case of detection errors are practically the same (in module) as weight
increases in case of correct detection. This is justified by the “constant”
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Figure 5.18: Scenario 3: Variance Weight
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Figure 5.19: Scenario 4: Instantaneous Weight
behavior of all peers in terms of both average values and variance of their
weights. Finally weight reductions obtained for variable sensors during the
first transactions are due to the fact that the detection errors produced by
such peers are highly biased around the first few simulation transactions.
5.4.4 Scenario 4: not all that glitters is gold
Scenario 4 presents a simple configuration of 10 variable REFACING peers,
with a detection error probability of 0.5. From simulation results we have
an average number of detection errors equal to 37, 8%. Unfortunately the
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Figure 5.20: Scenario 4: Average Weight
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Figure 5.21: Scenario 4: Variance Weight
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weighted D-S formula (with the REFACING approach) increases the num-
ber of misdetections with respect to the case with just basic D-S formula.
The same consideration can be extended for the majority voting approach,
which has provided an experimental improvement of 6.2% with respect to
the REFACING method. We figured out that the high false negative rate
characterizing the variable peers (with no mitigation effect from the reliable
peers as it happened in the previous scenarios) brings to assigning high in-
stantaneous weight values to these sensors. This has the effect of inverting
in most cases the output of the fusion process, thus increasing the percent-
age of detection errors with respect to the case when the basic D-S formula
is applied. This scenario clearly represents an example of a potential case in
which the very low reliability level of the detection peers causes an apprecia-
ble reduction of the otherwise positive effects of the weighted fusion process
exploiting the REFACING approach.
5.4.5 Summary considerations
To summarize the considerations we made, we herein provide in tabular
form the main performance figures characterizing each of the aforementioned
scenarios. Furthermore, in Figures 5.22 and 5.23 we analyze the performance
of the proposed Management Function. Figure 5.22 shows the percentage
of detection errors respectively in the presence and in the absence of the
REFACING management function, and in the case of majority voting. It can
be easily noticed that in all but the last scenario we achieve a considerable
performance improvement. The best figures are obtained for both scenarios
1 and 2. Indeed, Figure 5.22 highlights an error reduction to 0%. Good
results are also attained with scenario 3, with an overall decrease in the
error detection rate that is close to 40% with respect to the absence of the
REFACING function, and to 10% with respect to the majority vote. In all
cases we observe that the adoption of the REFACING approach guarantees
an error rate which is less than 10%. Again, with reference to scenario 4,
the trend inverts and shows a performance decrease close to 6%. As already
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Figure 5.22: Detection Error
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Figure 5.23: Detection Improvement
discussed, the reason behind such performance debacle can be ascribed to the
presence of a high number of sensors characterized by very poor detection
capabilities.
Chapter 6
A Secure Routing Protocol for
Wireless Mesh Networks
Nowadays, human activities rely more and more on wireless infrastructures.
Such technology is changing people’s behaviors since the possibility of mobile
communications has increased the number and the types of services provided
by the network.
Unfortunately, the growing diffusion of wireless technologies also opens
several issues, related in particular to network security. As stated in chapter 2
the lack of wired connections increases the risks of damages due to malicious
users.
The attempts to deny wireless services are becoming more and more fre-
quent and nowadays the DoS attacks are the main threats for these networks.
In this section we will deal with security problems in wireless networks.
We will then propose a cooperative solution to protect the network against
a specific class of DoS, namely the attacks to routing protocols.
6.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 we widely debated the problems of security in wireless networks.
In particular, we observed the criticality of attacks to routing protocols that
can compromise a fundamental functionality of these infrastructures. We
analyzed several attacks pointing out, in particular, the dangerousness of
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blackhole and grayhole attacks (see section 2.6). Subverted nodes can mali-
ciously interrupt forwarding mechanisms by dropping data packets that pass
through them. These attacks are very dangerous since they can considerably
reduce the availability of network services.
The problem of blackhole and grayhole attacks has been widely debated
and several solutions have been proposed [30, 32, 33]. A common features of
these solutions is the exploitation of cooperation among network elements.
Wireless networks, in fact, represent the best example of self-configured and
self-managed system due to cooperation. Nodes continuously collaborate to
offer network services since the system is extremely dynamic and there is no
centralized coordination. As the nodes cooperate to provide routing services,
similarly they might cooperate to identify and isolate the malicious elements
by sharing information.
By embracing this principle, we proposed an integrated solution that in-
cludes the peculiarities of cooperative systems presented in the previous work.
The idea is to extend the mechanisms and the results proposed for cooper-
ative IDS in the context of wireless network security in order to strengthen
the goodness of the cooperative solution presented.
The idea is to include mechanisms for cooperation into the routing proto-
col, in order to provide a new secure protocol. We will exploit the principle
of REFACING to design a reputation model that associates a “trustworthi-
ness” label with each node. These labels are used to avoid routes that include
malicious nodes. The definition of trustworthiness requires to exchange evi-
dence of anomalous activities of nodes. Activities detection, data exchange,
information fusion and the reactive mechanisms constitute the basis for our
cooperative solution.
The variety of technologies and solutions designed for wireless networks
suggested us to focus on a specific type of wireless networks and then extend
the principles to all the other environments. We decided to test the effective-
ness of our approach on a specific wireless technology, namely the Wireless
Mesh Networks (WMNs). A WMN represents an emerging solution in the
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wireless scenario. Due to its commercial success, WMNs are obviously be-
coming the favorite target of attacks, and a network inefficiency might have
serious economical and social impacts.
In the following section we will first provide some details about the WMNs
and then we will introduce our solution for a secure routing protocol based
on cooperative approach.
6.2 Wireless Mesh Networks
WMN is a key technology in the emerging context of wireless networks sce-
nario [60]. More and more deployments are currently available: campus and
company networking, community and neighborhood Internet access, building
networks represent only some examples of the spreading of this technology.
Due to its flexibility, Internet providers, government agencies, no-profit cor-
porations are developing WMNs to allow network access in areas where wired
solutions are too expensive to deploy, as for example low-income and under
resourced communities1 [61].
The main reason of its success is the low cost of technologies. Con-
ventional nodes such as desktops, laptops, PDAs, phones, Access Points
equipped with wireless interfaces can be included in a WMN deployment.
Furthermore, developing a WMN is not so difficult since it can exploit the
protocols designed for ad-hoc networks, from which a wireless mesh network
come.
As in ad-hoc networks, indeed, WMN nodes can exchange data, although
they are not in the transmission range of each other, by means of a multi-hop
communication made possible by intermediate nodes.
By deploying gateways and bridges, a WMN is capable to interconnect
different networks such as mobile ad-hoc networks and cellular networks, and
to connect itself to the Internet.
Moreover, due to its self-organizing and self-configured nature, a WMN
1http://www.techforall.org/tfa wireless.html
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Internet
Figure 6.1: A typical WMN deployment
can easily grow in size since adding a new node do not require to recon-
figure the entire network. The more are the WMN nodes the more is the
effectiveness of the network.
A typical WMN consists of two types of nodes (see Figure 6.1): mesh
routers and mesh clients. Mesh routers are fixed nodes, and they provide a
backbone infrastructure by means of routing protocols. Every mesh router
is equipped with one or more wireless interfaces, which may also implement
different medium access control (MAC) protocols. Mesh clients may be either
fixed or mobile. They are terminal hosts of the network and do not provide
routing functionality. The technologies adopted for both clients and routers
may be the same.
Based on this classification, a WMN architecture usually consists of two
connection tiers. An access tier that allows the client to connect to a mesh
router in the Infrastructure Architecture, and a backhaul tier for the inter-
connection of mesh routers.
In order to reduce the interference, the two tiers use different channels or
implement different MAC protocols. Anyway it is common to observe WMNs
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using the same radio technology for both access and backhaul tiers in order
to reduce the cost of deployment. Unfortunately this approach increases
the interference and reduces the overall throughput since clients and routers
contend for the same channel.
As stated above, since WMNs share common features with ad-hoc net-
works, usually routing protocols developed for these networks can also be
exploited for WMNs. Several routing protocols are adopted for WMNs such
as the active protocols DSDV (Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector) [62],
AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector) [63], DSR (Dynamic Source
Routing) [64], or the proactive ones such as OLSR (Optimized Link State
Routing) [65].
Despite the availability of several solutions for ad-hoc networks, routing
for WMNs is still an open research field. The mentioned protocols were
designed for satisfying the requirements of ad-hoc networks that are different
from those of WMNs. In particular some issues related to the security or the
optimization are neglected.
6.3 A Secure Routing Protocol: AODV-REX
As anticipated above in the chapter, we want to present a cooperative solution
for secure routing in the context of wireless mesh networks.
In chapter 3, we described the design requirements needed to implement
a cooperative system. In this section we briefly describe the “ingredients”
required to develop our system.
Firstly, a mechanism that is in charge to observe other nodes and to dis-
criminate between legitimate and illegitimate behavior is needed. Similar to
the IDS presented in chapter 4, this mechanism must detect illegal activities
of a set of nodes.
Another fundamental mechanism is the wide dissemination of behaviors’
data into the network. This opens several issues. Since the messages ex-
changed introduce an overhead, it is important to define a protocol for dis-
semination that limits the interference with the normal network operations.
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The reporting time also represents a challenge for a spreading protocol.
As observed for the cooperative IDS network, once information reaches
nodes we have the problem to define the best solution that, by fusing data,
can take the maximum advantage for the dissemination process.
Finally, a reaction mechanism is needed to exploit the result of coopera-
tion.
From an implementation point of view, we have two choices for designing
a cooperative mechanism: implementing the system from scratch, or exploit-
ing existing mechanisms and protocols for providing the cooperation. Since
information exchange is the core of any collaborative system, the latter seems
to be the best solution in order to reduce the overhead provided by a new
protocol.
In the context of routing protocols, we observe a close correlation between
the activities of route selection and the operation for cooperative security.
This suggests to merge the two mechanisms together, in order to improve
the overall effectiveness of the routing protocol.
Although it seems the best solution for facing the problem of secure rout-
ing, unfortunately this integrated approach requires a great effort for design-
ing an entirely new protocol. An alternative solution is to exploit existing
routing protocols ad extend it with a cooperative mechanism that enforces
the security of the protocol.
Based on this assumption we present an extension of a routing protocol
for wireless networks, AODV, that introduces the principle of cooperative
mechanisms for secure routing protocol. We called this new protocol AODV-
REX (AODV Reputation EXtention).
We chose AODV since it is the most common protocol in WMNs. The
choice of the protocol does not matter since our objective is to prove the
effectiveness of the proposed cooperative approach.
According to our idea of collaborative system, this new approach is based
on local information and global information. In particular, the approach
exploits a local and global reputation of the nodes suggested by the REFAC-
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ING reputation model. Similar to the solution proposed for the cooperative
IDS, these two sources of information, properly exchanged and integrated,
assure an improvement of the routing protocol security.
In the following we will provide several details about our new protocol.
However, prior to introducing AODV-REX, it is necessary to briefly present
the AODV protocol.
6.3.1 AODV
AODV [63] is an on demand protocol for Ad-hoc mobile network proposed by
Perkins et al. [66]. It is a reactive protocol since a route is established only
if explicitly requests for the source node. The route is maintained as long as
it is needed, afterwards it is deleted. The reactive feature of this protocol is
due to the need of an ad-hoc network to establish connection only when it
needs, since the mobile nature of infrastructure does not require to maintain
permanently the routes.
AODV supports both the unicast and multicast communications.
Although it have designed for Ad-hoc network, AODV is widely adopted
also in wireless mesh.
The protocol defines three different UDP messages:
RREQ - Route REQuest This message is generated for discovering the path
between a source, that requires it, and a destination.
RREP - Route REPly It is sent by the destination or intermediate nodes
upon reception of a RREQ.
RERR - Route ERRor This message is sent to announce problems on an
unreachable destination.
When a source needs to send data and a route to destination does not
already available, the node generates a RREQ message with information on
the destination that it want to reach (Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2: Route Request
Usually this happens if the route to destination is unknown, or a problem
on the route occurs, or the destination is unreachable. The RREQ is sent in
broadcast to all the neighbors. A related ID allows to identify univocally
different requests. Furthermore a correct management of Sequence Number
is needed in order to avoid loops in the route discovery process.
After broadcasting the request, the node waits for a RREP with information
about the destination to reach until a timeout expires, afterwards a new RREQ
is sent. In order to reduce the overhead due to unsuccessful requests, a binary
exponential backoff mechanism is implemented for RREQ generation.
When a node receives a RREQ it checks if a request from the same IP
source and with the same ID have been already received. In this case the
request is dropped. Otherwise, if the node is not the destination demanded
it creates or updates a reverse route, needed in case it will receive the RREP
to send back to source node. Finally the node updates the fields of message,
increments the Hop Count and broadcasts the message to the neighbors.
A RREP message is generated if, upon reception of the RREQ, node is itself
the destination or it has an active route to the destination demanded. The
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Figure 6.3: Route Reply
RREP is sent back in unicast through the next hop on the reverse path toward
the RREQ generator. The hop count is set whether one, if the node is the
destination requested, or the known distance in hops from the real destination
(Figure 6.3).
When an intermediate node receives a RREP it creates a forward route to
destination, in order to use it for the future data forwarding, increments the
Hop Count and sends back it in unicast toward the source by the reverse
route.
The RRER is generated for informing about a problem in routing process.
In particular a node can send a RRER both in unicast and multicast to its
neighbors if it detects a break for the next hop of an active forwarding route,
or if it does not have an active route for data packets received, or if it receives
a RRER from its neighbor.
As stated above, the routing table entries are temporary since the protocol
is on-demand: any time a new route is activated a Lifetime is associated to
it. A new process of request is needed when a route is not more activated.
A node may inform the neighbors about its connectivity by broadcasting
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them an HELLO message. Such message should be sent exclusively by the
nodes involved in an active route. If a node has not sent a broadcast message
(e. g. RREQ) in a time interval, it broadcasts a RREP message with destination
IP address its own address, the Hop Count 0, and a TTL 1. This assures
neighbors drop the message upon reception.
A Local Repair process is provided by the protocol when a link break on
an active route occurs. Locally the node upstream the break may decides
to repair the route if the distance to destination is less a well-known value.
It sends a new RREQ for the unreachable destination increasing the Sequence
Number of request.
AODV does not present any solution for improve the security of route
selection. A node that exhibits malicious behavior can not be excluded from
route if it correctly exchanges routing information. The shortest path is
selected even if a malicious node is included in it.
Our idea is to extend by AODV-REX the protocol providing it with a
mechanism that based on cooperation are able to reduce the risks that a
malicious node is selected in the route. In the following we describe this new
protocol.
6.3.2 The Watchdog
In this section we introduce the first of components that integrate the AODV
protocol: the watchdog.
The watchdog is the module that is in charge of control the behavior of
neighbors. According to the classification of the system proposed in chap-
ter 2, the watchdog could be consider a intrusion detection module, since it
discovers neighbors that exhibit anomalous behavior.
Based on the model proposed by Marti et al. in [30], watchdog observes
if the neighbors complete the forwarding process required when data packets
are sent to them. This is possible since the wireless channel is a broadcast
medium; if the reception and transmission ranges are the same, every for-
warding activities of a node is sensed by all its neighbors. In order to allow
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the watchdog implementation it needs to set the interface in promiscuous
configuration.
The watchdog works directly as an extension of forwarding process pro-
vided by the routing algorithm. Every time data packet is sent to next node
on the route, and if this node is not the final destination, the watchdog store
information about the packet in a buffer and actives a timer. The information
stored are usually enough to discriminate among different packet sensing on
the interface. Usually the buffered data are related to destination of packet,
the node at which the packet is sent, and the packet ID.
Based on the neighbors’ behavior the watchdog update the reputation
values of them. Two are the event that generate the reputation update. If
the node senses a packet forwarded by its neighbor and this is present in the
buffer a positive result to its activity is assigned and the data in buffer are
deleted. Otherwise, if a timeout for a packet stored occurs, the watchdog
provides to assign the neighbor a negative observation results.
The observations are the base for determining the value of direct repu-
tation provided by node for its neighbors. A queue of N observed events is
implemented in order to estimate node reputation that takes into account
past interaction between node and its neighbor. The main objective of this
solution is to introduce an “history” of events that could contribute to miti-
gate sporadic misbehavior which does not due to malicious attack.
Forwarded routing protocol data and broadcast packets are not buffered
since no useful information to determinate the behavior of neighbors can be
extracted from them. In particular, malicious node could forward routing
protocol packets and drop data packets in order to be involved anyway in
route establish process: it could attract data packets for dropping them later.
As stated above, the events observed by the watchdog are local to node,
so only a local reputation can be evaluate from them.
A more sophisticated process have to be implemented to provide a global
reputation of every node in the network. By a global reputation the nodes
can have a better view of the situation and they can provide a more effective
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routing process.
In the next section we will propose our solution for exchange information
on reputation in order to improve the capability to prevent ineffectiveness in
routing algorithm.
6.3.3 The Dissemination Protocol
In this section we introduce the mechanism provided by AODV-REX for
spreading information about the local observation into the network. This is
fundamental for defining the global reputation of node as we will see in the
section 6.3.4.
The main problem for a cooperative system is how to disseminate the local
information all around the partners in order to allow them to use information
to reinforce the opinion about a specific situation. Furthermore, we observe
that in wireless environment a selective dissemination process can not be
exploited due to the broadcast nature of the channel. For this reason the
solution for spreading data on local observation requires that information
must be carefully selected in order to avoid that malicious node can take
advantage from knowing the “opinion” of its neighbors.
Related to this problem we propose to propagate exclusively a reputation
that is a merging of local reputation and the reputations of other nodes in the
network. In this way the malicious node can not identify exactly its neighbor
that has begun to propagate bad reputation on it, and so it can not take
adequate countermeasures. In the section 6.3.4 we will provide details about
the merging of local reputation and the reputation coming from other nodes.
The information about the reputation are encapsulated in RREQ mes-
sage of the AODV protocol. In particular an “option” extension, called
Reputation Option, is applied to normal RREQ message. For each neigh-
bors the node inserts a Neighbor IP address and a Neighbor Reputation
(Figure 6.4(b)).
In order to allow nodes that implement AODV-REX to work in conjunc-
tion with nodes that do not support the reputation extension we can exploit
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Figure 6.4: RREQ massage format
the Reserved field in the RREQ message. This field is usually sent as 0 and
it is ignored on reception. By exploiting this field we can differentiate the
processing of RREQ from the protocol. Since AODV does not use Reserved
bits, we can inform about the presence of Reputation Option with the first
bit in the field, and with the other 10 bits we can number the Reputation
Option (Figure 6.4).
According to the AODV protocol, every time a node has data to send
it generates a RREQ message. Together with the usual AODV information,
our protocol fits the message with reputation on its neighbors. The RREQ is
broadcasted all the neighbor. The neighbors that receive the RREQ, it checks
for the presence of Reputation Option by Reserved field and retrieves in-
formation in the RREQ. If the a node present in Reputation Option is not
a neighbor for receivers, this descartes the information leaving unmodified
it in RREQ. Otherwise it exploits the reputation value, that can be consider
as a summarization of trustworthiness on a node from all the other nodes in
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Figure 6.5: RREQ process in AODV-REX
the network, to update with its local observation its new reputation value.
This new value is then fitted in the RREQ with together reputation values of
neighbors do not already present in the message. Finally this new message
is broadcasted all its neighbors (Figure 6.5).
This process assures that all the nodes in the network concord on the
reputation of every single node. Anyway a process that guarantees bed in-
formation does not propagate in through the nodes is needed. In section 6.3.4
we will provide a mechanism that assures such requirement.
6.3.4 The Reputation Extraction Process
The reputation extraction is the core of our proposal. As widely demon-
strated, data dissemination can contribute to improve the effectiveness of a
system, but it is important that data exchanged are correctly handled in
order to maximize the benefit coming form a cooperative approach.
In this section we will deal with the problem of merge local and global
information.
As announced above in the chapter, ADOV-REX is based on two reputa-
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tion levels which represent respectively the global and the local information:
a local reputation, coming from the observations provided by the watchdogs,
and a global reputation supplied by other nodes through dissemination pro-
tocol. Both local and global reputation are merged to define the reputation
that can be exploit to determinate the real behavior of node.
The problem of information merging can be described as follows.
Let RBA(i) be the reputation of node B at node A at i − th iteration,
while RGBA(i) represents the global reputation of node B at node A at i− th
iteration. Anytime node A receives a new reputation value RCB(i) on node
C is sent by node B through the RREQ message, the node A first weights this
information with the reputation RBA(i− 1) that it has with regard to B, in
order to reduce the risk of bad news propagated from malicious nodes. This
new information is then compared with the last reputation value on node C
at node A
RwCB(i) = RBA(i− 1) ∗RCB(i) (6.1)
∆CAB = |RGCA(i− 1)−RwCB(i)| (6.2)
The new global reputation of node C at node A is
RGCA(i) =
1
2
∗ (1 + ∆CAB) ∗RGCA(i− 1) +
1
2
∗ (1−∆CAB) ∗RwCB(i) (6.3)
Local and global reputation extraction are supported by a mechanism that
stores the recent events, both direct observations by watchdogs and global
reputation by other nodes, and on these computes the current reputation
values (see 6.3.2). Local and global reputations are extracted as a mean of
recent samples stored.
The mean formula exploits an approach that allows to node a “reintegra-
tion” if it has shown a faultless behavior recently. The longer is the time from
the last misbehavior the less is the weight in the average. For this reason we
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implement a Weighted Moving Average WMA. Let wlr be the weight of con-
tribution that we want assign the most recent value. We have the following
formula for the mean:
R¯BA = wlr ∗
N−1∑
i=1
(1− wlr)i−1 ∗RBA(i) + (1− wlr)N−1 ∗RBA(N) (6.4)
Now, according to REFACING model, the reputation extraction process
is implemented as follows. Whenever a new event happens, for example a
RREP message is received or a watchdog timer expires, we need to update the
reputation of the neighbor. We adopt an increment or decrement ∆BA of the
mean of previous reputation values R¯BA
RBA(i) = R¯BA(i− 1) + ∆BA(i− 1) (6.5)
In spite of the local and global reputation average defined by (6.4), for the
reputation we adopt a simple mean of all the previous reputation samples.
In order to set the value of ∆BA we need to evaluate the agreement be-
tween the global reputation and the local one of node B at node A. Let us
define R¯GBA e R¯
L
BA
the averages respectively of global and local reputation.
We compare this two value to evaluate the “distance” between them.
∆LGBA = |R¯LBA − R¯GBA| (6.6)
Clearly global and local information agree if ∆LGBA is lower then a well-
known threshold T , for example 0.5, otherwise they disagree. So in the first
case we adopt an positive value for ∆BA
∆BA = Γ ∗ (1− R¯BA) ∗
(1−∆LGBA)
2
(6.7)
If local and global disagree we observe that it can be a good solution
reduce the reputation since the overall system reputation of node B presents
some anomalous behavior. In this case it is better adopt a “conservative”
approach by setting negative value for ∆BA
A Secure Routing Protocol: AODV-REX 128
∆BA = −Γ ∗ R¯BA ∗
∆LGBA
2
(6.8)
The value of Γ represents a weight that takes into account the reputa-
tion, the interaction degree ID between the node and its neighbor, and the
variance of reputation:
Γ = α ∗ R¯BA + β ∗ ID + ω ∗ V RBA (6.9)
with:
α + β + ω = 1 (6.10)
In this case we set the following values
α = 0.6, β = 0.2, ω = 0.2. (6.11)
Once we compute the new value for reputation we have to update all
the value for reputation mean R¯BA and variance V
R
BA
adopting the following
formulas:
R¯BA(i) = R¯BA(i− 1) +
RBA(i)− R¯BA(i− 1)
N + 1
(6.12)
V RBA(i) =
N ∗ V RBA(i− 1) + (RBA(i)− R¯BA(i)) ∗ (RBA(i)− R¯BA(i− 1))
N + 1
(6.13)
The reputation value computed by 6.5 provides a unique vision of nodes
behaviors since it is a merge of what is observed locally and what the other
nodes observe. This information is the basement of our secure routing solu-
tion as will see in the next section.
This information is propagate to the nodes by the protocol described in
section 6.3.3.
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6.3.5 The Reputation and Route Selection
Once reputations have been propagated widely into the network, we need to
project an effective mechanism by which the cooperation can be exploited
for realize a secure routing protocol. The idea is to use nodes’ reputation to
influence the route selection process.
We observe that AODV choices the route based on hop count value: the
path selected is the shortest path in term of hop count. Our idea is to modify
the hop count values in order to carry also information about the nodes’
reputations along the path. We want to substitute the idea of shortest path
first, common to all routing protocol, with “most trustworthy” path first of
our solution. We suggest to “lengthen” the path traversing nodes with bad
reputation in order to avoid its selection.
As stated in the subsection 6.3.1 the length is defined during the reply
process, by counting the number of hops traversed: every time a node receives
the RREP message it increments the Hop Count value by one to account for
the new hop through the intermediate node. Our idea is to define a new
distance between two nodes that is not just a physical distance but a virtual
distance that take into account the reputation level of the node connected
to the link: the distance of two neighbor nodes increase by decreasing the
reputation of one of them. For this reason we introduce a new link metric
called Reputation Metric from node A to node B as follows:
RM ~AB = b(1−RBA) ∗NDc (6.14)
with RBA the reputation of the node connected at the link, and ND the
Network Diameter, the maximum network diameter define by the AODV
protocol. The Reputation Metric is added to physical distance.
By this solution, if reputation is 0 the metric is equal to the maximum
diameter of the network, otherwise the metric RM is 0 every time reputa-
tion of my neighbor is maximum. The use of floor function allows us to be
“indulgent” if rarely neighbor has a irregular behavior.
In the Figure 6.6 is depicted an example of AODV-REX reply process.
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Figure 6.6: RREP process in AODV-REX
When a node generates a RREP it set the Hop Count one as in AODV.
Upon the reception of RREP the AODV-REX protocol checks in its Reputation
Neighbor Table the value of reputation for the node that sent the RREP.
Then it computes the RM value by 6.14, and adds this to Hop Count. It is
further incremented in order to take in to account the physical hop. In this
way if RM is 0 Hop Count is incremented similar to AODV protocol.
When the RREP reaches the source of request this evaluate the RM with
regard to message sender, adds it to Hop Count in RREP and in case it starts
to use the route for sending data packets.
Again we observe that the AODV-REX is designed in order to work in
conjunction with AODV node: no modifications at RREP message format are
needed, so an AODV-REX RREP can be handled also by AODV protocol.
The solution to increment the distance by RM in RREP process assures
an intrinsic security of the protocol: by adopting this mechanism a subverted
node can not modify the distance since the the RM is added by downstream
nodes. It could modify the distance of RREP message received but anyway
its reputation is reflected in the RM computed by downstream node.
Experimental Results 131
0
1
12
16
2
6
13 9
4
3
8
11
5
GW
1
4
15
10
Figure 6.7: Experimental Topology
6.4 Experimental Results
In this final section we want to provide an evaluation of performance of
protocol proposed. We implemented the protocol as module of well-known
Network Simulator ns22 [67].
The scenario simulated consists of a random network topology of 17 WMN
nodes (Figure 6.7). The GW node is the gateway to Internet. Each node is
equipped with a single 802.11 interface with an omnidirectional antenna.
The malicious nodes are implemented by modifying in the code the for-
warding process. We designed a malicious bursting node where burst of
packets are dropped with probability of 0.3. The burst length is 20 packets.
The packets dropping is apply exclusively to data packets since we want that
also the malicious node are involved in the routing protocol operations. It
allows subverted nodes to be potentially included in routes.
We compare the AODV-REX and AODV. The choice of parameters to
evaluate is very important. We analyze exclusively the throughput. We
claim that the throughput represent a parameter that effectively synthesizes
2http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/
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Figure 6.8: UDP Throughput
the improvement of our solution. The objective of malicious node is to deny
the possibility for users to fully exploit the network services: by dropping
packet a node can decrease the overall throughput of network. Our idea is
to prove that by adopting AODV-REX instead of AODV we can optimize
the routing functionality, since ineffectiveness due to subverted node can be
properly faced.
So we compared throughput of network both with AODV and AODV-
REX, first with UDP traffic, then with TCP traffic. We consider 6 periodic
flows from several sources to the single gateway GW of our topology. The
choice to adopt periodic flow is required in order to allow the information on
nodes’ reputation to spread widely into the network.
Furthermore, we increased the numbers of nodes infected in order to
compare the behavior of AODV and AODV-REX in critical conditions.
In the graph 6.8 we depicted the trend of UDP throughput by increasing
the infection degree of the nodes. The UDP flows have a bit rate of 64
kbit/sec.
Generally we observed an improvement in the performance of AODV-
Experimental Results 133
TCP Traffic
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Infection Degree
Th
ro
u
gh
pu
t [
kB
its
/s
e
c
]
AODV (Burst)
AODV-REX (Burst)
Figure 6.9: TCP Throughput
REX with respect to AODV, except for low value of infection and for a full
network infection. As we have supposed, we observe a greater gain for value
of infection degree between 0.5 and 0.9. The reason is due to the grater
probability of AODV-REX to select “secure path” related to AODV: when
the infection degree is low the probability the AODV selects a bad path is
low, comparable with the AODV-REX one. Increasing the number of nodes
infected the probability to select paths passing through compromised nodes
increases. No gain can be observed when the network is completely infected.
In the graph 6.9 the results of the TCP throughput for both the AODV
and AODV-REX are shown.
Again we observe a gain in the performance of AODV-REX compare
to AODV. In this case the advantage to adopt our solution is lower then for
UDP traffic. The reason is that TCP protocol is connection oriented protocol
so mechanisms for reliable communications can limit the effects of malicious
packet dropping.
As observed for the UDP throughput, the greater performance gain is
present for a value of infection degree between 0.4 and 0.5.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we have dealt with security issues in computer networks. Se-
curity in networked system is a critical challenge since the people more and
more relies on services provided by the network.
This problem is widely debated by research communities and several solu-
tions have been proposed. Unfortunately the heterogeneity of infrastructure,
technologies, services and users make extremely complex to propose a global
approach to security problems.
An alternative is represented by the possibility to adopt different solutions
and integrate them through a coordinated and collaborative approach.
In this context we offered our original contributions by investigating the
opportunities offered by a cooperative approach for network security based
on distributed information.
We analyzed the main requirements needed to design a system exploiting
such approach. Mechanisms for data dissemination with together the demand
of effective algorithms for combining them represent the main challenges that
we had to deal with.
Closely connected with the problem of information fusion is the issue
to avoid that bad information might compromise the effectiveness of data
sharing. Some information, in fact, could be deliberately or casually altered
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producing a decrease in system performance.
Based on these assumptions, we proposed our solutions for prevent and
detect attacks to computer networks. In particular we focused on two type
of threats, both related to Denial of Service attacks: the volume-based and
the wireless protocol routing attacks.
By adopting a general framework for cooperative approach based on dis-
tributed information, we designed a distributed intrusion detection system
and a new secure routing protocol for wireless network. Both solutions share
the some design principles. This confirms the goodness of framework pro-
posed since it is possible to adopt it in different security context.
Furthermore we defined a new model for reputation that we applied suc-
cessfully to both the context analyzed. We observed that the reputation is
fundamental for limiting both malicious activities and inefficiencies of single
elements of distributed system.
The results showed that the cooperation exploiting distributed informa-
tion can effectively improve the performance of security system in both wired
and wireless network scenarios. In particular volume-based attacks can be
adequately faced by integrating different elements in a distributed system
that exploits the collaboration of its single parts to detect the attacks. At
the same time the risks due to some specific class of DoS at routing protocol
in a wireless scenario can also be limited by sharing evidence of anomalous
behaviors and exploiting this information for building reputation of partners.
Moreover we proved that the new reputation model improves the capabil-
ity of a distributed system to limit impact of misbehaving elements, as well
as it can be exploited to successfully implement a new routing protocol and
metric for a wireless mesh network.
7.2 Future Work
The results of our approach allow to be confident related to the possibility
of extend it in several directions.
Firstly it might be possible analyze the effectiveness of solutions proposed
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to face new DoS attacks. The independence of cooperation mechanisms from
the local detection do not limit the typologies of DoS attacks that can be
identified.
Moreover exploiting the framework’s principles it might be possible to
design new mechanisms for new type of attacks. Since the approach pro-
posed is extremely generic, in fact, we could extend the cooperation also for
emerging threats as botnets.
Finally, some improvements should be required for the centralized system
that is in charge to evaluate the reputation of the partners in distributed IDS.
A full distributed solution could be explored to increase its effectiveness and
to reduce the risks coming from a single point of failure.
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